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Introduction
Over 80% of Canadians use the Internet and approximately 20 million Canadians are active on
social media networks.1 It is not surprising that criminal activity is taking place in these global
digital communities and this is raising challenges for criminal law and the criminal justice
system.2 The Supreme Court of Canada recently recognized in R. v. K.R.J.3 that “[t]he rate of
technological change over the past decade has fundamentally altered the social context” in
which certain crimes are occurring and social media networks have given “unprecedented
access to potential victims and avenues” for offending.4
This annotated Criminal Code aims to be a resource for scholars, judges, Crown prosecutors
and defence counsel, police, and others interested in social media and criminal law. After the
relevant Criminal Code provisions in bold, a brief description of the general law related to them
appear, followed by a more detailed set of case summaries that describe the application of each
provision in the social media context. These summaries are concise enough to identify
potentially relevant judicial decisions quickly so that readers can then consult the full decisions.
The following offences are covered in this annotated Criminal Code:

• Participation in the activity in a terrorist group (s. 83.18)
• Counselling the commission of an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction of or
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

in association with a terrorist organization (ss. 2, 83.24-27, 464)
Public mischief (s. 140)
Sexual interference (s. 151)
Invitation to sexual touching (s. 152)
Sexual Exploitation (s. 153)
Voyeurism (s. 162)
Child pornography (s. 163.1)
Luring a child (s. 172.1)
Indecent acts (s. 173)
Criminal harassment (s. 264)
Uttering threats (s. 264.1)
Sexual assault (s. 265)
Inciting hatred (s. 319)
Unauthorized use of a computer (s. 342.1)
Extortion (s. 346)

1
Statistics Canada, “Police-reported cybercrime in Canada, 2012”, by Benjamin Mazowita &
Mireille Vézina, in Juristat, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014); Shea Bennett,
“59% use Facebook in Canada (LinkedIn: 30%, Twitter: 25%, Instagram: 16%)”, Ad Week, (February 4,
2015), online: <http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/canada-social-media- study/614360>.
2
Maryke Silalahi Nuth, “Taking Advantage of New Technologies: For and Against Crime”, (2008)
24:5 Computer L & Security Rev 437; Thaddeus Hoffmeister, “The Challenges of Preventing and
Prosecuting Social Media Crimes”, (2014) 35:1 Pace Law Review 115.
3
R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 SCR 906.
4
Ibid, para 102.
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Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly,
any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist
group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.
Prosecution
(2) An offence may be committed under subsection (1) whether or not
(a) a terrorist group actually facilitates or carries out a terrorist activity;
(b) the participation or contribution of the accused actually enhances the ability of a
terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity; or
(c) the accused knows the specific nature of any terrorist activity that may be
facilitated or carried out by a terrorist group.
Meaning of participating or contributing
(3) Participating in or contributing to an activity of a terrorist group includes
(a) providing, receiving or recruiting a person to receive training;
(b) providing or offering to provide a skill or an expertise for the benefit of, at the
direction of or in association with a terrorist group;
(c) recruiting a person in order to facilitate or commit
(i)
a terrorism offence, or
(ii)
an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be a
terrorism offence;
(d) entering or remaining in any country for the benefit of, at the direction of or in
association with a terrorist group; and
(e) making oneself, in response to instructions from any of the persons who
constitute a terrorist group, available to facilitate or commit
(i)
a terrorism offence, or
(ii)
an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be a
terrorism offence.
Factors
(4) In determining whether an accused participates in or contributes to any activity of a
terrorist group, the court may consider, among other factors, whether the accused
(a)
uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies, or is
associated with, the terrorist group;
(b)
frequently associates with any of the persons who constitute the terrorist
group;
(c)
receives any benefit from the terrorist group; or
(d)
repeatedly engages in activities at the instruction of any of the persons who
constitute the terrorist group.
2001, c. 41, s. 4.
*****
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General case law
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence is direct or indirect participation in, or
contribution to, a terrorist group’s activity. S. 83.18(3) provides a list of behaviours to assist in
determining what amounts to participation or contribution; s. 83.18(4) provides additional indicia
of participation and contribution. This list does not expand the normal meaning of participation
or contribution, it “simply allows the courts to ‘consider’ the factors identified”.1 S. 83.01(1) of the
Criminal Code defines “terrorist activity” and “terrorist group” for the purposes of 83.18, with s.
83.05 providing a non-exhaustive list of “listed entities” that qualify as terrorist groups.2 The
mens rea of this offence has two components: first, the impugned act must be done “knowingly”;
second, the accused must have a subjective purpose of improving a terrorist group’s ability to
facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity.3 A purposive analysis of s. 83.18 excludes convictions
for “(i) innocent or socially useful conduct absent any intent to enhance the abilities of a terrorist
group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, and (ii) conduct that a reasonable person would
not view as capable of materially enhancing the abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry
out a terrorist activity.”4
— 1United States of America v. Nadarajah, 2010 ONCA 859, 09 OR (3d) 662, para. 18-19,
aff’d Sriskandarajah v United States of America, 2012 SCC 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609.
— 2United States of America v. Sriskandarajah, 2010 ONCA 857, 109 OR (3d) 680, para.
17, aff’d Sriskandarajah v United States of America, 2012 SCC 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609.
— 3United States of America v. Nadarajah, 2010 ONCA 859, 09 OR (3d) 662, para. 22, aff’d
Sriskandarajah v United States of America, 2012 SCC 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609; R. v.
Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555, para. 46.
— 4R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555, para. 53.
Charter concerns — freedom of expression — fundamental justice — The purpose of the
terrorism legislation does not violate the Charter s. 2(b)’s protection of freedom of expression.
There is also no evidence that the definition of “terrorist “activity” as per s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) will
have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. S. 83.18 is not overbroad, nor is its impact
grossly disproportionate; as such, it does not violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
— R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555.
*****

Social media case law
Evidence — The accused had, amongst other conduct, added a friend on Facebook from high
school who had gone to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group. This constituted
evidence that the accused knew Al-Shabaab was a terrorist group.
— R. v. Hersi, 2014 ONSC 4414, 115 W.C.B. (2d) 289.
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Counselling the commission of an indictable offence
for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association
with a terrorist organization
2 [...] "terrorism offence"
"terrorism offence" means
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

an offence under any of sections 83.02 to 83.04 or 83.18 to 83.23,
an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament committed for
the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group,
an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament where the act or
omission constituting the offence also constitutes a terrorist activity, or
a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, or being an accessory after the fact in
relation to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c);

*****
83.24 Proceedings in respect of a terrorism offence or an offence under section 83.12
shall not be commenced without the consent of the Attorney General.
83.25 (1) Where a person is alleged to have committed a terrorism offence or an
offence under section 83.12, proceedings in respect of that offence may, whether or
not that person is in Canada, be commenced at the instance of the Government of
Canada and conducted by the Attorney General of Canada or counsel acting on his or
her behalf in any territorial division in Canada, if the offence is alleged to have
occurred outside the province in which the proceedings are commenced, whether or
not proceedings have previously been commenced elsewhere in Canada.
(2) An accused may be tried and punished in respect of an offence referred to in
subsection (1) in the same manner as if the offence had been committed in the
territorial division where the proceeding is conducted.
83.26 A sentence, other than one of life imprisonment, imposed on a person for an
offence under any of sections 83.02 to 83.04 and 83.18 to 83.23 shall be served
consecutively to
(a) any other punishment imposed on the person, other than a sentence of life
imprisonment, for an offence arising out of the same event or series of
events; and
(b) any other sentence, other than one of life imprisonment, to which the person
is subject at the time the sentence is imposed on the person for an offence
under any of those sections.
83.27 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, a person convicted of an indictable
offence, other than an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment for life is
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imposed as a minimum punishment, where the act or omission constituting the
offence also constitutes a terrorist activity, is liable to imprisonment for life.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply unless the prosecutor satisfies the court that the
offender, before making a plea, was notified that the application of that subsection
would be sought.
2001, c. 41, s. 4.

*****
464. Except where otherwise expressly provided by law, the following provisions apply in
respect of persons who counsel other persons to commit offences, namely,
(a) every one who counsels another person to commit an indictable offence is, if
the offence is not committed, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the
same punishment to which a person who attempts to commit that offence is
liable; and
(b) every one who counsels another person to commit an offence punishable on
summary conviction is, if the offence is not committed, guilty of an offence
punishable on summary conviction.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 464; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 60.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — S. 464(a) prohibits the counselling of an indictable offence, even where
that offence is not committed by the person counselled. The actus reus for counselling is that
the materials or statements made or transmitted actively induce or advocate, and do not merely
describe, the commission of an offence. The mens rea is either of an intention that the offence
counselled be committed, or knowingly counselled and was reckless as to whether the offence
would be committed.1 S. 2 describes a “terrorism offence”, and states that the counselling of any
of the proscribed terrorism offences is itself a terrorism offence. Ss. 83.24-83.27 provide for
special procedures and sentencing provisions related to terrorism offences, most notably that
they are subject to a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. This provision has been found
not to offend the totality principle.2
— 1 R. v. Hamilton, 2005 SCC 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 432.
— 2 R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555.

*****

Social media case law
Evidence — Charter s. 7 — Police techniques to preserve evidence of social media
activity — The accused had created a number of pro-ISIS Facebook pages, and made frequent
posts on those pages, all of which were alleged to constitute counselling the commission of
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indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist
organization. The defence challenged the admission of screenshots of those posts based on s.
7 of the Charter, and ss. 31.1-31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), which deals with the
admission of electronic documents. The defence argued that the screenshots were an
insufficient method of preserving the posts as evidence. They argued that, instead, the police
ought to have used forensic-grade software, which had been demonstrated to be available to
them, to preserve the code underlying the posts, including any associated metadata, so as to
allow for a later reconstruction of the entire post, including any surrounding context from the
page on which the post was located.
The court found that the Crown had failed to establish the integrity1 of the documents. The
police officers that took the screenshots did not believe that they would be used as evidence in
court, but only to generate further leads. As a result, they did not fully expand some truncated
posts, and some screenshots contained artefacts that blocked part of the relevant post. This
meant that the screenshots could not be compared with metadata later received via a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty request related to the Facebook posts. The posts were nonetheless
found to be authentic, as the investigating police officers could testify that they matched what
was visible to them on the computer screen. The court noted, however, that the issue of
authorship, that is, whether the accused actually created the posts, was a factual issue to be
resolved at trial.
Moving on to the best evidence rule, the court found that although the problems with the way
that the screenshots were collected prevented the Crown from relying on the presumption of
integrity under the CEA, nevertheless, they were the best available evidence, and ought to be
admitted.
Turning to the Charter s. 7 argument, the defence had argued that the metadata and other
information that might have been captured by a more skilful search, using more advanced
software, would be relevant evidence that would meet the relevant test for disclosure. The
defence submitted that the failure to do so, and the deletion of some original screenshots,
amounts to the loss and destruction of evidence. The court rejected this suggestion, and found
that, although some evidence may have been lost, the RCMP did not act with unacceptable
negligence, and later took steps to preserve evidence. As a result, no breach of s. 7 was found.
— R. v. Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 676, [2017] B.C.J. No 986.
— 1The court differentiated integrity from authenticity, noting that integrity requires that
the documents be proven not to have been altered from their original form, whereas
authenticity simply requires that the documents be confirmed to be what they purport or
appear to be. Integrity is not to be addressed at the admissibility stage, but rather later
upon weighing the evidence.

Evidence – Charter s. 8 – Charter s. 10 – The accused was charged with four terrorism counts
arising from posts he made on Facebook. The defence brought a pre-trial application for a
remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter for s 8 and s. 10(b) violations. In a previous pre-trial
application, R v Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 467, the BCSC addressed the s. 10(b) violation and
found that the accused’s s. 10(b) right was violated. The focus of this decision is the s. 8
violation, which occurred when the RCMP searched the accused’s email accounts without
judicial authorization. The Crown conceded that the s. 8 violation occurred.
9

The unlawful search was the result of a miscommunication between the officer who searched
the accused’s email accounts and that officer’s superior. The court found that the search did not
satisfy s. 24(2) because the impugned evidence was not obtained in a manner that denied or
violated the accused’s rights. Admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of
justice into disrepute because the impact of the Charter-infringing conduct was relatively minor.
In addition, the evidence was highly important to the case and likely unavailable from any other
source. The defence application was dismissed.
— R v Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 867, 2017 CarswellBC 1397
Evidence — Collective assessment of Facebook posts — The accused was charged with
four terrorism counts arising from posts he made on Facebook. Three of the counts were for
counselling offences, which required the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused “actively induced” others to commit the indictable offences. The Crown’s position was
that the Court could consider all 85 of the posts that were submitted as evidence collectively, as
none of the posts could individually provide adequate proof of active inducement. The defence
rejected that position, submitting that the posts were never meant to be read together as they
were published in different contexts to different audiences over a ten-month period. The
defence’s position was that any inferences drawn from the posts collectively would be
unreliable. The court rejected the Crown’s argument, concluding that the collective content of
the posts was inadequate to satisfy the Crown’s onus to establish the actus reus of the
offences. The court accepted that it is possible in some circumstances to infer or find active
inducement from a series of posts or comments on social media. However, it found that it would
be illogical and unreasonable to read the posts together in this case because the collection of
posts was very large and covered many topics.
One particular post contained graphic details about how “lone wolves” may commit murder or
assault, and invited “brothers of Islam in Egypt seeking jihad” to listen to that description. The
court concluded that the post appeared to be an active inducement to others to commit murder
and assault. However, based on missing context and the accused’s evidence about that missing
context, the court did not accept that post as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also
found that the Crown could not rely on the “lone wolf” post with respect to the count of inducing
others to commit the offence of mischief in relation to property for the benefit of, at the direction
of or in association with a terrorist group. As a result, the court found the accused not guilty on
all counts.
— R v Hamdan, 2017 BCSC 1770, 2017 CarswellBC 2708
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Public mischief
140 (1) Every one commits public mischief who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace
officer to enter on or continue an investigation by
(a) making a false statement that accuses some other person of having committed an
offence;
(b) doing anything intended to cause some other person to be suspected of having
committed an offence that the other person has not committed, or to divert
suspicion from himself;
(c) reporting that an offence has been committed when it has not been committed; or
(d) reporting or in any other way making it known or causing it to be made known that
he or some other person has died when he or that other person has not died.
Punishment
(2) Every one who commits public mischief
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 140; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 19.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence can be any of the actions outlined in s.
140(1)(a) to (d), provided that they cause a peace officer to begin or continue an investigation.
The meaning of “offence” under s. 140 extends beyond crimes in the Criminal Code; it is
equivalent to a “breach of law involving penal sanction”.1 It is unnecessary to establish on a voir
dire the voluntariness of statements alleged to constitute the actus reus of a s. 140 offence.2
“Reporting” can be to entities other than the police, such as the Children’s Aid Society or a
prison official. If these organizations refer the report to the police, and the accused “intends that
the police act upon it”, then all essential elements have been met.3 The mens rea of this offence
is a specific intent to mislead a peace officer. Situations where a police officer does not, in fact,
embark on an investigation, but the accused does have the requisite intent in making the false
report, can be dealt with as an attempt to commit this offence.4
— 1R. v. Howard (1972), 3 O.R. 119, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 211 (ONCA).
— 2R. v. Stapleton (1982), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 239; 26 CR (3d) 361 (ONCA).
— 3R. v. Delacruz (2009), 249 C.C.C. (3d) 501, 87 W.C.B. (2d) 55 (ON SC) at para. 15., aff’d
in R v. Delacruz, 2013 ONCA 61, 105 W.C.B. (2d) 437.
— 4R. v. Whalen (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 557, [1977] B.C.J. No. 1097 (PC) at para. 9-10, cited
with approval in R. v. Poirier (1989), 101 N.B.R. (2d) 67, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 276 (NBCA).
*****

Social media case law
Definition of “Swatting” — “Swatting involves tricking an emergency service agency into
dispatching an emergency response based on a false report of an ongoing critical incident.
11

Swatting can lead to the deployment of a range of emergency response teams including police,
fire and bomb squads and the evacuation of businesses, schools or other public institutions.”
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 4.
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Sexual interference
151 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of
the body or with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of 16 years
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 151; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 1; 2005, c. 32, s. 3; 2008, c. 6, s.
54; 2012, c. 1, s. 11; 2015, c. 23, s. 2.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence is directly or indirectly touching any part
of the body of a person under 16 years, either with the accused’s body parts or an object. The
mens rea requires specific intent to touch for a sexual purpose.1 An “accused who intends
sexual interaction of any kind with a child and with that intent makes contact with the body of a
child ‘touches’ the child and is guilty” of sexual interference.2 Where the accused is found guilty
of sexual assault and sexual interference, the Kienapple principle may prevent multiple
convictions.3
— 1R. v. Bone (1993), 85 Man. R. (2d) 220, 81 C.C.C. (3d) 389 (MBCA).
— 2R. v. Sears (1990), 66 Man. R. (2d) 47, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 62 (MBCA).
— 3 R. v. C.G.F., 2003 NSCA 136, 219 N.S.R. (2d) 277, para. 38-39; R. v. R.C.M., 2007 NLTD
29, 798 A.P.R. 322; R. v. Lonegren, 2008 BCSC 1817, 81 W.C.B. (2d) 613; R. v. Alyea
(1997), 100 B.C.A.C. 241, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2702, para. 3-4.
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to,
among others, an offence under s. 151. This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA).
*****

Social media case law
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages — “It defies
rational belief that for two hours and forty-nine minutes…someone pretending to be [the
accused] was sending and receiving approximately 80 Facebook messages on his account,
while deleting each message so that [that accused], who was also on his Facebook account
during that night, never saw any of the messages.”
— R. v. I.W.S., 2013 ONSC 4162, 107 W.C.B. (2d) 518, para. 123.
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages – The accused
was charged with the sexual interference and sexual assault of his 4-year-old daughter. The
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accused alluded to committing the offences in a Facebook communication with a family friend’s
daughter. At trial, the accused denied molesting his daughter, and also denied ever
communicating with the family friend’s daughter on Facebook. The court concluded that to
believe someone other than the accused sent the Facebook messages would “strain credulity.”
Further, “[t]he accused's denial of that damning piece of evidence entirely undermines his
credibility on the central issues,” namely, his denial of the charged offences.
— R. v. B.R., [2017] O.J. No. 3782, 2017 ONSC 4429, para 40, 54
Use of inculpatory Facebook messages — After having touched the complainant’s breasts in
her home while her parents were briefly absent, the accused returned to his home, and later
sent the complainant an apology via Facebook messenger, which the accused then deleted
before the complainant could show her parents. This apology, and another which was later
received via text message to the complainant’s mother, were found to be equivocal, and so
were given little weight by the court.
— R. v. Douglas, 2017 CanLII 6878 (NL PC), [2017] N.J. No. 59.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain complainant’s age – The 15-year-old complainant told
the accused that she was 24 years old. The court found that the complainant’s stated age was
not inconsistent with her appearance or the information on her Facebook profile. The court
concluded that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did
not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age.
— R. v. Konneh, 2019 ABQB 3, 2019 CarswellAlta 17
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain complainant’s age – The accused was charged with
sexual interference and sexual assault. The court found that the complainant had pursued the
developmentally delayed accused, who has an estimated grade four education. Taking this
context into account, the court concluded the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the
complainant’s age — the accused asked the complainant for her age, but “received a coy
response”; he checked her Facebook page and found no birthdate; he knew she was attending
high school; and his belief that she looked older than sixteen was corroborated by a photo filed
as an exhibit. The court acquitted the accused on both charges.
— R. v. C.G.V., [2017] O.J. No. 6485, 2017 ONCJ 850
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The court noted that the
complainant lied about her age and her Facebook profile picture “shows a young person trying
to seem significantly older than her 14 years” (para. 9). However, while the complainant may
have been manipulative, this was “[a]ll the more reason” the 40-year-old accused should have
made more inquiries into the complainant’s age before having sex with her (para. 56). The court
convicted the accused of sexual interference and sexual assault.
— R. v. Beckford, 2016 ONSC 1066, 28 W.C.B. (2d) 298.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —Though there was no
evidence as to whether the accused had access to the complainant’s full Facebook profile, it
was plausible that the accused saw the complainant’s fake age on Facebook. This was one of
eight factors that led the court to conclude there was reasonable doubt as to whether the
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accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. The court acquitted
the accused of sexual assault and sexual interference.
— R. v. Akinsuyi, 2016 ONSC 2103, 129 W.C.B. (2d) 515.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The 17-year-old accused
had a sexual relationship with the 12-year-old complainant. Among other things, the court found
the complainant lied about her age and posted pictures of herself on Facebook designed to
make her look sexually mature. The accused immediately terminated the relationship after the
complainant told him she was twelve. The court acquitted the accused of sexual assault and
sexual interference.
— R. v. R.R., 2014 ONCJ 96, 112 W.C.B. (2d) 302.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The complainant listed her
age as 16 on Facebook, when she was in fact 12. The court noted it was common for youth to
lie about their age to gain access to Facebook, thus the complainant’s behavior was not
“particularly probative of dishonesty” (para. 47). On the facts, the court found the accused did
not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age, and thus convicted him of
sexual assault (and directed a conditional stay of proceedings on the sexual interference
charge).
— R. v. Z.I.D., 2012 BCPC 570, [2012] B.C.J. No. 3079.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The court accepted that the
accused honestly believed the complainant was at least 16 or 17, in part due to the
complainant’s listed age on Facebook, and the “general tenor of her website pages…[as] trying
to portray herself as someone much older than thirteen” (para. 22). Other factors included racial
difference and the accused’s recent arrival to Canada from St. Vincent. On the facts, the court
found the accused to have taken reasonable steps to ascertain her age, and acquitted him of
sexual assault and sexual interference.
— R. v. Garraway, 2010 ONCJ 642, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 210.
Subjective belief of the complainant’s age – The BCSC accepted that the 53-year-old male
accused held the subjective belief that the 14-year-old male complainant was 16. The court
came to this conclusion in part based on evidence from the complainant’s Facebook page,
including the fact that his Facebook profile may have indicated that he was 16, and that it
contained images in which he looked older. Ultimately however, the court determined that the
accused failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age before engaging
in sexual activity with him, and the accused was convicted.
— R. v. Angel, 2018 BCSC 794
Honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s age – The accused was charged with
sexual interference and sexual assault. “Notwithstanding that the Complainant's Facebook
profile identified her as 16 years old and said she went to the high school in Community B, and
she had used filters on her profile pictures to enhance her apparent age, I am satisfied that
these factors did not cause the Accused to have an honest belief that she was 16 years old or
older. The Accused testified that he only looked at a few of the pictures. He did not claim that
the Complainant's Facebook profile or photographs led him to believe that she was 16.”
— R. v. J.M., [2017] N.J. No. 223, 2017 NLTD(G) 110, 139 W.C.B. (2d) 250, para 51
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Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s.
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section
161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906.
Sentencing —The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and breach of probation. The
court treated the accused’s planned and deliberate contact of the victim through “Facebook
(where teenagers live)” as an aggravating factor (para. 105).
— R. v. Scott, [2014] 1117 A.P.R. 179, 121 W.C.B. (2d) 609 (NLPC).
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and
luring a child. Among other conditions, the court imposed a s. 161 prohibition order for life,
which included a prohibition on using the Internet or other digital network, unless for
employment, seeking employment, or education.
— R. v. Stanley (2014), 119 W.C.B. (2d) 419, [2014] O.J. No. 6378 (ONCJ).
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. The accused’s
Facebook messages to the victim were used as evidence to show the accused’s manipulative
behaviour and high risk for future sexual misconduct. The court thus emphasized the principles
of denunciation and deterrence. Among other things, the court imposed a 3-year probation order
that included a prohibition from owning, touching, or possessing any computer system or any
other device capable of accessing the Internet.
— R. v. Lamb, 2013 BCPC 137, 107 W.C.B. (2d) 199.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. Citing a report
from the Sentencing Council for England and Wales, the court noted that the exchange of
“sexual images” of the victim (in this case, over Facebook) was an aggravating factor (para. 11).
— R. v. Nightingale, [2013] N.J. No. 31, 104 W.C.B. (2d) 1235 (NLPC).
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching,
sexual exploitation, harassment, and use of a forged document. All of the charges arose out of a
six-year relationship that began when the complainant was 13 and the accused was 37. The
accused was a firefighter who had acted as a first aid instructor to the complainant. After the
complainant broke off contact with the accused, the accused’s harassment included following
the complainant, waiting outside her home, and creating a fake Facebook profile under another
name in order to get the complainant to contact him. The accused argued for a sentence of 10
months, equivalent to the pre-trial time credited, but this was found to be insufficient given the
serious and ongoing nature of the conduct, the serious impact on the complainant, and the
accused’s abuse of a position of trust and authority.
— R. c. Turcotte, 2017 QCCQ 318, EYB 2017-275806.
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Invitation to sexual touching
152 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or incites a person under
the age of 16 years to touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an
object, the body of any person, including the body of the person who so invites,
counsels or incites and the body of the person under the age of 16 years,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 152; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 1; 2005, c. 32, s. 3; 2008, c. 6, s.
54; 2012, c. 1, s. 12; 2015, c. 23, s. 3.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — actus reus — The actus reus of this offence is fulfilled when the
accused invites, counsels, or incites a child under 16 to touch a person, including the accused
or the child themselves, for a sexual purpose.1 “Touch” should be interpreted purposively,
consistent with Parliament’s objective to prevent sexual exploitation of children, and thus covers
both actual and indirect touching.2 Touching need not have actually occurred, given that the
“core verbs [of this offence] involve communication”; such communication can be express or
implied.3 An accused’s request to touch the victim in a sexual manner can constitute the actus
reus of this offence.4
— 1R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 33, aff’d R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56,
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds.
— 2R. v. Fong, 1994 ABCA 267, 157 A.R. 73, para. 10.
— 3 R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 35, aff’d R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56,
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds.
— 4R. v. Gray (2004), 190 O.A.C. 319, [2004] O.J. No. 4100 (ONCA).
Essential elements — mens rea — The mens rea of this offence requires knowingly
communicating for a sexual purpose with a person under 16 years old, where the accused
either intended, or knew that there was a substantial and unjustified risk, that the child would
receive that communication as being an invitation, incitement, or counselling to do the physical
conduct that s. 152 prohibits.1 The mens rea must be present when the communication occurs,
but such present intent does not need to be intent for imminent sexual touching. A trier of fact
could infer from “dirty talk” that the accused had “present intent to manoeuvre the child
psychologically towards sexual touching” by normalizing such touching through the “dirty talk”.2
— 1R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 40, aff’d in R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC
56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds.
— 2R. v. Legare, 2008 ABCA 138, 429 A.R. 271, para. 47, aff’d in R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC
56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551 on other grounds.
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Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to,
among others, an offence under s. 152. This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA).
*****

Social media case law
Invitation to sexual touching via Facebook — The accused’s sexual messages and “penis
pictures” shared with the 15-year old complainant via Facebook were for the purpose of
facilitating invitation to sexual touching. The accused was also found guilty of the offence of
luring a child in s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302.
Invitation to sexual touching via Snapchat — The accused and complainant began “sexting”
each other when the complainant was only 15 years of age, including explicit Snapchats and
Skyping where nude images were shared. The court found that this conduct constituted the
offence of Invitation to Sexual Touching, even though “the Crown could not explain…why this
crystal clear offence had no been charged” (para. 355).
— R. v. J.J.O, 2016 ONCJ 264, 130 W.C.B. (2d) 665.
Invitation to sexual touching via Facebook — After the 34-year-old accused had sexual
intercourse with the 15-year-old complainant, he sent sexually explicit messages to the
complainant’s Facebook account, inviting her to “finish what they had started the night before”.
The judge found the accused knew he was sending messages to the complainant (as opposed
to her 22-year-old cousin), and convicted him of invitation to sexual touching.
— R. v. Clarke, 2016 SKCA 80, 480 Sask. R. 277.
Facebook listed age rejected as evidence —The court rejected fresh evidence of the
complainant’s listed age on Facebook, because the complainant had already told the accused
over Facebook “in no uncertain terms” that she was 15. Thus, the age listed on her Facebook
page “would be unlikely to overcome” the accused’s “clear understanding that the complainant
was 15” (para. 112).
— R. v. Clarke, 2016 SKCA 80, 480 Sask. R. 277.
Facebook evidence to support complainant’s account of events — The complainant’s
recollection of events from childhood and early adolescence was inconsistent, but the court
found her credible in part because “the Facebook conversations [between the complainant and
accused] are strong evidence supporting the complainant’s general account of events” (para.
78). The accused’s denial of writing the Facebook messages was not believed.
— R. v. J.S.M., 2015 NSSC 312, 127 W.C.B. (2d) 90.
Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s.
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section
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161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and
luring a child. Among other things, the court imposed a s. 161 prohibition order for life, which
included a prohibition on using the internet or other digital network, unless for employment,
seeking employment, or education.
— R. v. Stanley (2015), 119 W.C.B. (2d) 419, [2015] O.J. No. 6378 (ONCJ).
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on
children (para. 17). Consequently, the court found that it “must resort to imprisonment,
emphasizing the sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and
dismissed the accused’s argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18).
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other
offences. In determining that the accused bore a high level of moral blameworthiness, the court
noted the accused’s “use of the internet…has elements of disturbing online sexual harassment
– an adult criminally cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless
unknown entity,” he was also “all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to invitation to sexual touching. The court noted that
“access to young persons by way of internet or cell phone text is so readily available that the
court must attempt to deter others from engaging in this conduct” (para. 31). At the same time,
the Facebook contact between the parties was an isolated chat, as opposed to messaging over
a long period time. Consequently, the court went beyond the minimum of 90 days, but kept the
sentence to the lower range of sentencing at 6 months incarceration.
— R. v. Kanigan, 2014 SKQB 147, 445 Sask. R. 247.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to invitation to sexual touching, possession and
distribution of child pornography, and transmission of sexually explicit material to a child. The
accused’s proposed sentencing case law had significantly lower dispositions than what the
Crown proposed. The court distinguished the accused’s proposed sentencing case law on the
facts, and also noted “the legal landscape is evolving as Courts become more aware of the
dangers that this type or sexual harassment and cyber bullying invokes” (para. 33).
— R. v. N.L.G., 2015 MBCA 81, 323 Man. R. (2d) 73.
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Sexual exploitation
153 (1) Every person commits an offence who is in a position of trust or authority
towards a young person, who is a person with whom the young person is in a
relationship of dependency or who is in a relationship with a young person that is
exploitative of the young person, and who
(a) for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with
an object, any part of the body of the young person; or
(b) for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or incites a young person to touch, directly
or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, the body of any person,
including the body of the person who so invites, counsels or incites and the body
of the young person.
Punishment
(1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term
of one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days.
Inference of sexual exploitation
(1.2) A judge may infer that a person is in a relationship with a young person that is
exploitative of the young person from the nature and circumstances of the relationship,
including
(a) the age of the young person;
(b) the age difference between the person and the young person;
(c) the evolution of the relationship; and
(d) the degree of control or influence by the person over the young person.
Definition of young person
(2) In this section, young person means a person 16 years of age or more but under the
age of eighteen years.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 153; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 1; 2005, c. 32, s. 4; 2008, c. 6, s.
54; 2012, c. 1, s. 13; 2015, c. 23, s. 4.

*****

General case law
Essential elements — s. 153 — The language in ss. 153 (a) and (b) is similar to that in ss. 151
and 152, respectively, with the difference being that s. 153 applies to complainants between 16
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and 18 years old. In addition to the different age range of the complainant, s. 153 also requires
that the accused be in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, a person with
whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency, or be in a relationship with the
complainant that is exploitative of the complainant. Proof of mens rea is, of course, required for
each element. The presence of any of the trust, authority, dependency, or exploitation
relationships will suffice to make out this offence, and no proof is necessary that the accused
actually abused their position or relationship by engaging in the prohibited conduct.1
— 1R. v. Audet (1996), 2 S.C.R. 171, S.C.J. No. 61.
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to,
among others, an offence under s. 153(1). This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA).
*****

Social media case law
Sentencing — Sexual Interference (s. 153(1)(a)) — The accused, a substitute teacher in the
16 year old complainant’s class, was found guilty at trial of Sexual Interference contrary to s.
153(1)(a). Despite a probation report indicating that the accused was at a low risk of recidivism,
the court found, after an exhaustive review of sentencing precedents and principles for this
offence, that the accused’s position of trust as a teacher, and the importance of similarly
situated individuals maintaining appropriate boundaries, required that the sentence emphasize
general deterrence over rehabilitation. The court found this prioritization was necessary in order
to communicate to teachers that their position of power renders their students incapable of
consenting to sexual activity, even in the face of their students’, or their students’ parents’,
apparent consent. Among the factors pointed to by the court as evidence of the accused’s
failure to maintain appropriate boundaries was the accused having added the complainant as a
friend on Facebook, where they later exchanged messages to plan the encounters that formed
the subject matter of the charge. The accused was sentenced to six months of incarceration,
double the 90-day mandatory minimum.
— R. c. Lapointe, 2016 QCCQ 1951, J.E. 2016-796.
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Voyeurism
162 (1) Every one commits an offence who, surreptitiously, observes — including by
mechanical or electronic means — or makes a visual recording of a person who is in
circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if
(a) the person is in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude,
to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged
in explicit sexual activity;
(b) the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her
breasts, or is engaged in explicit sexual activity, and the observation or recording
is done for the purpose of observing or recording a person in such a state or
engaged in such an activity; or
(c) the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose.
Definition of visual recording
(2) In this section, visual recording includes a photographic, film or video recording
made by any means.
Exemption
(3) Paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) do not apply to a peace officer who, under the authority of a
warrant issued under section 487.01, is carrying out any activity referred to in those
paragraphs.
Printing, publication, etc., of voyeuristic recordings
(4) Every one commits an offence who, knowing that a recording was obtained by the
commission of an offence under subsection (1), prints, copies, publishes, distributes,
circulates, sells, advertises or makes available the recording, or has the recording in his
or her possession for the purpose of printing, copying, publishing, distributing,
circulating, selling or advertising it or making it available.
Punishment
(5) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (4)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Defence
(6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the acts that are
alleged to constitute the offence serve the public good and do not extend beyond what
serves the public good.
Question of law, motives
(7) For the purposes of subsection (6),
(a) it is a question of law whether an act serves the public good and whether there is
evidence that the act alleged goes beyond what serves the public good, but it is a
question of fact whether the act does or does not extend beyond what serves the
public good; and
(b) the motives of an accused are irrelevant.
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R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 162; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 4; 2005, c. 32, s. 6.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — s. 162(1) — Voyeurism is committed where a person 1) surreptitiously;
2) observes or makes a visual recording (defined in s. 162(2)); 3) of a person who is in
circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy; and 4) the actions outlined
in 162(1)(a), (b), or (c) are fulfilled.1 There is debate as to whether “surreptitiously” includes an
element of mens rea (i.e. that the accused must intend that the victim not know that they were
being observed or recorded).2 Assessing a “sexual purpose” (as per s. 162(1)(c)) includes
sexual gratification as a factor, but not a sole or essential factor.3 Without direct evidence, a
court could infer that the purpose of photographing women’s buttocks is most likely sexual (as
per s. 162(1)(c)), but that is not the only rational inference.4 The interpretation of privacy
expectations under s. 162 “must keep pace with technological development”5 — for instance, it
is reasonable for beach goers to expect that close-up imagery of one’s private areas “will not be
captured as permanent record for the photographer, and potentially millions of others on-line”.6
— 1R. v. Keough, 2011 ABQB 48, 501 A.R. 26.
— 2R. v. Lebenfish, 2014 ONCJ 130, 112 W.C.B. (2d) 628.
— 3R. v. Jarvis, 2015 ONSC 6813, 126 W.C.B. (2d) 598.
— 4R. v. Taylor, 2015 ONCJ 449, 124 W.C.B. (2d) 56.
— 5R. v. Rudiger, 2011 BCSC 1397, 98 W.C.B. (2d) 101, para. 117.
— 6R. v. Taylor, 2015 ONCJ 449, 124 W.C.B. (2d) 56, para. 32.
Essential elements — s. 162(4) — This section creates an offence of trafficking or possessing,
for the purpose of trafficking, a recording made as a result of an offence under s. 162(1). This
section includes a mens rea of actual knowledge that the recording was obtained by the
commission of such an offence. This offence is considered more serious than those in s. 162(1).
— R. v. Desilva, 2011 ONCJ 133, 93 W.C.B. (2d) 412, para. 20.
Meaning of “reasonable expectation of privacy” — Though s. 162(1) requires assessing a
“reasonable expectation of privacy”, using s. 8 Charter jurisprudence in this assessment should
be pursued with caution. S. 8 interpretation is based on different principles than that of
interpreting Code provisions: the expectation of privacy under s. 162 relates to a complainant,
versus an accused under s. 8, and s. 8 typically addresses privacy interests that have limited
relevance under s. 162 of the Code. Nevertheless, s. 8 jurisprudence is relevant to the extent
that privacy is a “protean concept”, relevant considerations include that privacy must be
assessed on the totality of the circumstances, that an expectation of privacy is a normative,
rather than descriptive standard, and that a privacy inquiry protects people, not places.
— R. v. Rudiger, 2011 BCSC 1397, 98 W.C.B. (2d) 101.
*****

Social media case law
Sentencing – The accused was convicted of criminal harassment and voyeurism. He had
posted a sexually explicit video of the complainant on his Facebook page. He sent the link to 13
friends and family, “inviting them to view the video”. The video was also sent as an attachment
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to the emails. The court concluded there was no actual wide circulation of the video. However,
“[g]iven the common use of social networking sites and their potential for enormous harm,
general deterrence plays a significant principle in this sentencing” (para. 34).
— R. v. Desilva, 2011 ONCJ 133, 93 W.C.B. (2d) 412.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to voyeurism. In determining the sentence, the court
noted: “It seems to me that the principle focus of the sentence here should be denunciatory. It
should also strive to deter this person and others from this type of offence. In this age of
computers, "iPhones", Facebook, and YouTube, there is a very real risk that images like this
could be disseminated around the world.”
— R. v. F.G. (2011), 93 W.C.B. (2d) 416, 308 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 59 (NLPC).
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Publication of an Intimate Image Without Consent
162.1 (1) Everyone who knowingly publishes, distributes, transmits, sells, makes
available or advertises an intimate image of a person knowing that the person depicted in
the image did not give their consent to that conduct, or being reckless as to whether or
not that person gave their consent to that conduct, is guilty
(a) of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than
five years; or
(b) of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Definition of intimate image
(2) In this section, intimate image means a visual recording of a person made by any
means including a photographic, film or video recording,
(a) in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal
region or her breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity;
(b) in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were circumstances that
gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
(c) in respect of which the person depicted retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy at the time the offence is committed.
Defence
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the conduct that
forms the subject-matter of the charge serves the public good and does not extend
beyond what serves the public good.
Question of fact and law, motives
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3),
(a) it is a question of law whether the conduct serves the public good and whether
there is evidence that the conduct alleged goes beyond what serves the public
good, but it is a question of fact whether the conduct does or does not extend
beyond what serves the public good; and
(b) the motives of an accused are irrelevant.
2014, c. 31, s. 3
*****

General case law
Essential elements – Actus reus – The accused had dated the complainant on and off for
about three years; during the off periods, the complainant dated B.L. The accused took a video
of himself and the complainant having sex without her consent. After some confrontation
between the accused and B.L., the accused sent a screenshot of the aforementioned video to
B.L. The complainant testified the screenshot was taken from the accused’s Facebook profile,
meaning the screenshot had been “made public on Facebook for some period of time” (para
23). The accused was found guilty of making an intimate image of the complainant available
without the complainant’s consent, contrary to s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code.
— R. v. Verner, [2017] OJ No 3206, 2017 ONCJ 415
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Essential elements – s. 162.1(2)(a) – “intimate image” – The court considered whether the
word “nude” was disjunctive or conjunctive with the other words of s. 162.1(2)(a), which
constitutes one element of “intimate image”. The court found that the word “nude” was
disjunctive, and as such, s. 161.1(2)(a) could be established in three ways: “where the person is
nude; where the person's genital organ, anal region or breasts are exposed; or where they have
engaged in explicit sexual activity” (para 43). Given the complainant was nude in the
screenshot, s. 161(2)(a) was established.
— R. v. Verner, [2017] OJ No 3206, 2017 ONCJ 415
Essential elements – s. 162.1(2)(a) – “explicit sexual activity” – The court found that the
word “nude” was disjunctive, and as such, s. 161.1(2)(a) could be established in three ways:
“where the person is nude; where the person's genital organ, anal region or breasts are
exposed; or where they have engaged in explicit sexual activity” (para 43). Given the
complainant was nude in the screenshot, s. 161(2)(a) was established. The court found that the
impugned screenshot could be considered “explicit sexual activity” under s. 161(2)(a). The
screenshot depicts two nude parties, positioned near a bed; it was also “taken the context of an
act of sexual intercourse” (para 64).
— R. v. Verner, [2017] OJ No 3206, 2017 ONCJ 415

Social media case law
Fabrication of Facebook messages – The Crown’s position was that the accused attempted
to extort the complainant using intimate images of her, and that he posted two such images on
Facebook and Skype without her consent. The court found that, despite the complainant’s
testimony to the contrary, she had sufficient knowledge of computers such that she could have
accessed the accused’s Facebook account and feigned the offending messages which were
presented at trial. The accused was acquitted on both counts.
— R. v. Sobh, 2018 ONSC 2299
Complainant’s consent to distribution of images – The Crown’s position was that the
accused attempted to extort the complainant using intimate images of her, and that he posted
two such images on Facebook and Skype without her consent. The court concluded that the
complainant may have given blanket consent for the accused to post intimate images during
their relationship. If her consent was later withdrawn, the Crown failed to demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that the relevant images were still on the Internet at that time. The accused
was acquitted on both counts.
— R. v. Sobh, 2018 ONSC 2299
Sentencing – The accused recorded sexual acts between himself and the complainant, who
was not aware of the recording and did not consent to it at the time it was made. The
complainant did consent to the taking of nude photos as long as the accused did not distribute
them. Nevertheless, the accused published the intimate videos and images on Facebook and
Instagram. In concluding that a prison sentence was necessary to achieve the sentencing
objectives of deterrence and denunciation, the court considered several aggravating factors.
The court noted that the accused planned his offending behaviour, his actions were not
momentary or impulsive, and that he could have stopped at any time but chose to proceed. The
accused was sentenced to five months imprisonment followed by a 12-month probation term.
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— R. v. Haines-Matthews, 2018 ABPC 264, 2018 CarswellAlta 2753
Sentencing – In sentencing the offender, who pled guilty, the court was “mindful of certain
realities” which suggested “a less severe sentence than those imposed in other situations”. The
court distinguished these “realities” from “mitigating considerations”. One such reality was that
the intimate images were not posted widely on the internet, but only to a limited and identified
set of individuals who were the complainant’s family and friends. The court acknowledged that
these circumstances likely heightened the complainant’s feeling of embarrassment, but
indicated that these individuals were less likely to republish the images, thus lessening the
lasting impact of the offence.
— R. v. J.B., 2018 ONSC 4726
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to distributing intimate images without the complainant’s
consent. The accused had dated the complainant for three years. The distribution occurred via
direct messaging on Instagram. The accused admitted he wanted revenge when he sent the
pictures. Aggravating factors included the accused’s attempt to use the photos to extort the
complainant to talk to him; abuse of the complainant’s trust; and the traumatic impact on the
complainant. Mitigating factors included the accused’s expression of remorse; apparent
appreciation of impact on the victim; and high chance of rehabilitation. The court imposed a
conditional discharge with a three-year probation order, and a “significant community service
order.” Further, the court noted the centrality of the Internet to a person’s everyday life, and that
courts “should avoid imposing orders that create overbroad or unreasonable restrictions on an
individual’s liberty”. Consequently, the accused was restricted from Internet use and social
media access for the first six months of his probation, “rather than [under] the broader
provisions of section 162.2”.
— R. v. Calpito, [2017] O.J. No. 1171, para 111-112, 2017 ONCJ 129
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Child pornography
Definition of child pornography
163.1 (1) In this section, child pornography means
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was
made by electronic or mechanical means,
(i)
that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of
eighteen years and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit
sexual activity, or
(ii)
the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose,
of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of eighteen
years;
(b) any written material, visual representation or audio recording that advocates or
counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would
be an offence under this Act;
(c) any written material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a sexual
purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that
would be an offence under this Act; or
(d) any audio recording that has as its dominant characteristic the description,
presentation or representation, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a
person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act.
Making child pornography
(2) Every person who makes, prints, publishes or possesses for the purpose of
publication any child pornography is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of one year.
Distribution, etc. of child pornography
(3) Every person who transmits, makes available, distributes, sells, advertises, imports,
exports or possesses for the purpose of transmission, making available, distribution,
sale, advertising or exportation any child pornography is guilty of an indictable offence
and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year.
Possession of child pornography
(4) Every person who possesses any child pornography is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10
years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a
term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of six months.
Accessing child pornography
(4.1) Every person who accesses any child pornography is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10
years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or
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(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a
term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of six months.
Interpretation
(4.2) For the purposes of subsection (4.1), a person accesses child pornography who
knowingly causes child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, himself or
herself.
Aggravating factor
(4.3) If a person is convicted of an offence under this section, the court that imposes the
sentence shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the person committed the
offence with intent to make a profit.
Defence
(5) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (2) in respect of a visual
representation that the accused believed that a person shown in the representation that
is alleged to constitute child pornography was or was depicted as being eighteen years
of age or more unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of that
person and took all reasonable steps to ensure that, where the person was eighteen
years of age or more, the representation did not depict that person as being under the
age of eighteen years.
Defence
(6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the act that is alleged
to constitute the offence
(a) has a legitimate purpose related to the administration of justice or to science,
medicine, education or art; and
(b) does not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years.
Question of law
(7) For greater certainty, for the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether
any written material, visual representation or audio recording advocates or counsels
sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence
under this Act.
1993, c. 46, s. 2; 2002, c. 13, s. 5; 2005, c. 32, s. 7; 2012, c. 1, s. 17; 2015, c. 23, s. 7.
*****

General case law
Defining child pornography — “Person” in s. 163.1(1)(a) includes both actual and imaginary
persons. An objective approach should be applied to the terms “depicted” in s. 163.1(1)(a)(i), as
well as “dominant characteristic” and “sexual purpose in s. 163.1(1)(a)(ii). “Explicit sexual
activity” in s. 163(1)(a)(i) refers to acts which viewed objectively fall at the extreme end of the
spectrum of sexual activity (e.g. acts involving nudity or intimate sexual activity).1 S.
163.1(1)(a)(ii), however, provides that materials that depict intimate areas of children are
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extreme, without more.2 “Advocates or counsels” in s. 163.1(b) may include implicit messages in
written material.3
— 1R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45.
— 2R. v. J.E.I., 2005 BCCA 584, 204 C.C.C. (3d) 137, para. 16.
— 3R. v. Beattie, [2005] 75 O.R. (3d) 117, 196 O.A.C. 95 (ONCA).
Proof of offence — 163.1 — “The normal inference that one intends the natural consequences
of one's actions is applicable to computer usage just as it is to any other human activity [...]”
— R. v. Missions, 2005 NSCA 82, 196 C.C.C. (3d) 253.
Essential elements — 163.1(2) — “Making” —There is conflicting jurisprudence as to whether
“making” child pornography includes or excludes copying existing child pornography onto a CD,
DVD, hard drive, or other form of storage.
— R. v. Keough, 2011 ABQB 48, 501 A.R. 26 (finding that mere copying will qualify as
“making”).
Essential elements — 163.1(3) — “Distribution” —Sharing files through an Internet filesharing program will fulfil the actus reus of this offence. The mens rea is intent, actual
knowledge or wilful blindness that the pornographic material was being made available (not that
the accused must knowingly, by some positive act, facilitate the availability of the material).1 In
the context of file-sharing programs, where the accused is aware the program is based on open
information sharing, it is logical to infer that the accused was aware he would be sharing
information with third parties.2 However, where the accused deletes the child pornography files
from the shared file, there may be reasonable doubt as to their intent to make child pornography
available.3
— 1R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2 S.C.R. 212.
— 2R. v. Johannson, 2008 SKQB 451, 335 Sask. R. 22.
— 3R. v. Pressacco, 2010 SKQB 114, 352 Sask. R. 276.
Essential elements — 163.1(4) — “Possession” —“Possession” is generally defined in s.
4(3). Under s. 163.1(4), mere automatic caching of a file to a hard drive is insufficient to
constitute possession; one must knowingly store and retain the file.1 Constructive possession
may be found even where the accused aborted downloading and the images were never
viewed.2 The accused must have knowledge of the content of the material in possession, but
not that the material constituted child pornography.3 Evidence of the “accessing” offence in s.
163.1(4.1) is not sufficient to establish the “possession” offence in s. 163.1(4).4
— 1R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, 1 S.C.R. 253.
— 2R. v. Daniels, 2004 NLCA 73, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 393.
— 3R v Chalk, 2007 ONCA 815, 88 OR (3d) 448.
— 4R v Farmer, 2014 ONCA 823, 318 C.C.C (3d) 322.
Essential elements — 163.1(4.1) — “Accessing” — This offence is made out where the
accused “knowingly caus[es] child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, oneself.”1
Viewing child pornography online constitutes the crime of accessing child pornography.2
— 1R. v. R.D., 2010 BCCA 313, 489 W.A.C. 133.
— 2R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, 1 S.C.R. 253.
Essential elements — Defence of legitimate purpose — 163.1(6) — The defence in s.
163.1(6) has two elements: 1) that the accused have a legitimate purpose for possessing the
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material (five exhaustive categories of which are listed in s. 163.1(6)(a)), and 2) that the conduct
complained of does not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under 18.1 On the first element,
the purpose must be subjectively related to one of the five categories listed, and there must also
be an “objectively verifiable” connection between the conduct and the stated legitimate purpose.
Specifically, this requires an objective connection between the accused’s actions and purpose,
and between that purpose and one or more of the protected categories.2
— 1R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, 3 SCR 326.
— 2R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, 3 SCR 326, para. 60.
Charter concerns — Private use exception — S. 163.1(4) unjustifiably restricts freedom of
expression in two scenarios: 1) where written materials or visual representations are created
and held by the accused alone, exclusively for personal use; or 2) visual recordings, created by
or depicting the accused, that depict lawful sexual activity and are held by the accused
exclusively for private use. There is thus an exemption of such material from charges of making
and possessing child pornography.
— 1R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, 1 S.C.R. 45.
Charter concerns — Private use exception — Availability of exception — The private use
exception from Sharpe is only available where: 1) The sexual activity is lawful, including by
reference to the offence of Sexual Exploitation contained in s. 153, 2) all participants consent to
the recording, and 3) the recording is created and retained strictly for the private use of those
involved.1 Threats to show a private recording to third parties should be considered in
determining whether the private use exception applies.2
— 1R. v. Barabash, 2015 SCC 29, 2 S.C.R. 522.
— 2R. v. Dabrowski, 2007 ONCA 619, 86 O.R. (3d) 721.
*****

Social media case law
Definition child pornography — The complainant’s “selfies” depicted a young girl’s breasts.
The court found that this constituted child pornography based on “common sense and judicial
opinion” (para. 14). The Facebook messaging about the photographs was also sexualized, and
it was immaterial that the accused was 16 years old at the time, even though he was not the
accused that typically comes to mind when we think of harms associated with child
pornography.
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340.
Definition of child pornography — The accused downloaded several photos of a 15-year-old
girl from her Facebook profile, then “doctored” them to make them sexual. This constituted child
pornography.
— R. v. Bowers, 2013 BCPC 383, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 63.
Private use defence — Using a fake Facebook account to extort the complainant, the accused
and his friend agreed to reveal the identity of the fake account in exchange for a sexual picture
of the complainant. The complainant sent two selfies exposing her breasts, and the accused did
not reveal his true identity. The private use defence fails, because the complainant’s consent to
producing sexual images “was exploited, manipulated consent” (para. 47).
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340.
31

Making child pornography — Age of the complainant — The accused, the coach of a sports
team, sent messages via text and Facebook to several players asking for photographs of their
genitals. Some of the players provided such photos, for which the accused was convicted of
making child pornography, as well as luring and exploitation offences. The accused was
acquitted of the child pornography charges in relation to one complainant, as there was a
reasonable doubt about whether the exchange of photographs had begun before or after the
complainant’s 18th birthday, with the Crown only able to provide evidence of photos being sent
after that day.
— R. v. Cristoferi-Paolucci, 2017 ONSC 207, [2017] O.J. No. 1217.
Possession for the purpose of distribution — The accused watched his friend use remote
computer access to share sexual photos of the complainant to other people on Facebook. The
accused’s decision not to shut the remote access “door” makes him party to his friend’s
possession of child pornography for the purpose of distribution.
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340.
Possessing and making child pornography available via Facebook and Twitter — seizure
of cell phone — The warrantless seizure of the accused’s cell phone did not infringe s. 8 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The police had received reports via American
authorities from Facebook and Twitter that a user had uploaded pornographic images of young
males. After identification of the accused, in all of the circumstances, their decision to seize his
cell phone without a warrant was reasonable to prevent an imminent danger of the loss or
destruction of evidence.
— R. v. Neill, 2016 ONSC 4963, 134 W.C.B. (2d) 457.
Constitutionality of child pornography provisions’ scope — On appeal, the accused argued
that new legal issues (gross disproportionality as a principle of fundamental justice, and Canada
(Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, clarifying separate s. 7 and s. 1 analysis) justified
reconsidering R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2. The court agreed and ordered a new trial. Regarding
the accused’s argument that the aforementioned child pornography provisions also violate s. 15,
the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision that s. 163.1(3) and (4) do not create a
distinction on the basis of age of the offender.
— R. v. M.B., 2016 BCCA 476, 135 W.C.B. (2d) 221.
Constitutionality of mandatory minimum — The accused used hypotheticals to argue the
mandatory sentencing provisions in s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code violated s. 12 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One hypothetical imagined a 17-year-old female consensually
taking and sharing sexual pictures with her 18-year-old boyfriend, who then shares the pictures
with another, potentially on social media. Bound by R. v. Schultz (2008 ABQB 679), the court
said the one-year mandatory minimum in this scenario would not violate s. 12.
— R. v. Watts, 2016 ABPC 57, 31 Alta. L.R. (6th) 105.
Identity of Facebook users on device – Child pornography was found on an iPhone belonging
to the accused, but identity was at issue because the accused was not the sole user of the
device. The iPhone was used to access two Facebook accounts which did not appear to belong
to the accused; however, the evidence did not establish that those accounts were actually held
by other individuals. The court noted that a person can adopt any name he or she wishes in
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creating a Facebook account. Furthermore, there was no indication that other possible
Facebook users used the phone for any purpose other than to access Facebook.
– R. v. Paquette, 2018 BCSC 1462
Sentencing – The accused lured six victims, all girls between 12 and 14 years old, using
Snapchat. He coerced his victims into sending him nude photographs, which he saved and
stored on his iPhone. In the sentencing decision, the court considered the fact that he never had
a face-to-face meeting with any of his victims, finding that he did not demonstrate any intention
to commit sexual acts with them. The court stated that this was not a mitigating factor, but
instead removed from consideration factors that would otherwise justify a longer term of
imprisonment.
— R. v. Kron, 2018 ONCJ 622
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to possession of child pornography and internet luring.
The accused had created a fake Facebook identity to persuade an 11-year-old girl to engage in
sexually explicit conversation, and send him sexually explicit pictures of herself. He also sent
her pictures of an adult penis. Though the accused characterized his actions as a “stupid
decision”, the court rejected this narrative and emphasized a high moral culpability. Specifically,
the court noted the accused “was involved in the internet luring of a child through a medium in
which children are particularly susceptible to influence because of the importance it plays in
their daily lives: Facebook. To use Facebook in this manner illustrates a commitment to the
commission of a sexual offence against a child which is alarming.”
— R. v. Clarke, [2017] N.J. No. 230, 2017 NLPC 1317A00102, para 88
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to making child pornography available. The judge found
the accused’s actions — i.e. uploading pictures of young boys engaging in “sexual activities
which are sexual assaults” — allowed an inference of “sufficient psychological harm to be bodily
harm”. Additionally, the “bodily harm does not end when the photo or video is made, it continues
each time, the image is viewed and distributed.” As such, the accused’s acts constituted a
“violent offence” under s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and allowed for imposition
of custody for a young offender.
— R. v. G.D., [2017] O.J. No. 2308
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of 11 counts of sexual interference and exploitation
of four young children. About a decade later, he was subsequently convicted of sexual abuse of
a two-year-old child, possessing and distributing (through Facebook) child pornography, and
having breached a s. 161 order. Among other things, the accused was prohibited for life from
using the Internet or other digital network, unless for counselling or employment and in the
presence of the counsellor or employer.
— R. v. Campbell (2017), 136 W.C.B. (2d) 468, [2017] N.J. No. 1 (PC).
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, possession of child pornography, and
11 counts of extortion. The terms of his 18-month probation included, among other things: not
possessing or using any computer or other device that has Internet access, except with
advance written permission; monitored use of Internet access, if granted; and the accused’s
identification by his full real name when communicating with anyone by means of a computer or
other device, including via including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or any other social network.
— R. v. R.W., 2016 ONCJ 325, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 68.
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Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to possessing and making child pornography available.
Among other things, his probation term included a condition to surrender any computer or
electronic device, as well as his user ID or passwords, to the RCMP or to his probation officer if
they ask, for inspection purposes. The sentencing judge specifically refrained from forbidding
computer use, “because computers have a big place in our world” and “things like email and
Facebook…can actually help [the accused] not feel as isolated” (para. 58).
— R. v. King, 2016 NWTSC 29, 130 W.C.B. (2d) 85.
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of extortion, possession of child pornography, and
possession of child pornography for the purpose of distribution. Among other things, his
conditional discharge order prohibited accessing any “internet based social media sites”. The
court was concerned social media restrictions may impair the accused’s ability to overcome his
social anxiety and reintegrate, but the nature of the accused’s offending made “it inappropriate
to permit social media access” unless and until rehabilitative progress is made (para. 56).
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 66, 366 N.S.R. (2d) 57.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual touching, possession and distribution of child
pornography, and transmission of sexually explicit material to a child. The accused offered
sentencing case law that had significantly lower dispositions than what the Crown proposed.
The court distinguished the accused’s proposed cases on the facts, and also noted “the legal
landscape is evolving as Courts become more aware of the dangers that this type or sexual
harassment and cyber bullying invokes” (para. 33).
— R. v. N.L.G., 2015 MBCA 81, 323 Man. R. (2d) 73.
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography.
She made a fake Facebook account and posted a pornographic photo of the victim on the
victim’s Facebook wall. The court deemed this a “planned offence that was vengeful” and “a
form of bullying that society condemns” — thus, it would be “contrary to the public interest to
allow [a discharge]” (para. 7). The distribution of the material through the anonymity of the
Internet was also deemed an aggravating feature.
— R. v. K.F., 2015 BCPC 417, 128 W.C.B. (2d) 653.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual touching, possessing and distributing child
pornography, and transmitting sexually explicit material to a child. The court noted that “bullying
and sexual exploitation of children, via social media, represents a new and disturbing
phenomena in our society” (para. 1). It thus imposed, among other things, twelve months of
supervised probation, which included a prohibition on accessing social media or possessing any
device that provides access to the Internet.
— R. v. N.G., 2014 MBPC 63, 311 Man. R. (2d) 286, varied on other grounds R. v. N.L.G.,
2015 MBCA 81, 124 W.C.B. (2d) 418.
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time
ago”; and that the court better understands now the severe impact online sexual exploitation
can have on children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment,
emphasizing the sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and
dismissed the accused’s argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18).

34

— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to possessing child pornography. Among other things,
the court imposed a two-year probation order prohibiting Internet or other digital network
access.
— R. v. Bowers, 2013 BCPC 383, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 63.
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of 53 counts related to child pornography, including
posting, accessing, and producing child pornography on Facebook. His use of Facebook to
meet other like-minded individuals was considered an aggravating factor. Among other things,
the court imposed a 20-year s. 161 order prohibiting the accused from using a computer system
for the purpose of communicating with a person less than 16 years old.
— R. v. Pattison, 2012 SKQB 330, 403 Sask. R. 145.
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of possessing child pornography and luring. The
offences related to the sending of a single photo by the complainant to the accused. The
accused had gone too far in what was a misguided attempt to relate to a young person who
faced similar difficulties to those faced by the accused during his youth in the same community,
and this case was distinguished from the majority of child pornography cases involving large
“collections”. The accused was Aboriginal, posed no risk of recidivism, and had been on highly
restrictive bail conditions without breaches for 5 years. The sentencing proceeded on the
provisions as they stood in 2011, with no minimum for the luring, and 14 days minimum for the
child pornography. The accused was sentenced to 60 days intermittent on the child
pornography charge, and a 9-month conditional sentence on the luring charge.
— R. v. Crant, 2017 ONCJ 192, [2017] O.J. No. 1493.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and distribution of child
pornography. The accused had produced videos of sexual interference with the daughter of his
partner, and had tweeted a pornographic video of an unrelated minor, accompanied by a
caption suggesting sexual predation. This tweet was what initially alerted the police to the
accused’s activities. The court rejected an argument by the accused that the posting of a single
image should attract only the mandatory minimum sentence. The court found that, given the
“abhorrent” nature of the tweet and the image it contained, more than the minimum was
required. The accused was sentenced to 15 months on the child pornography charge, and 24
months consecutive on the sexual interference. As well, the three-year probation order to follow
the time in custody included a term requiring the accused to provide details of their cellphone
and Internet service accounts, and allow a probation officer to inspect any devices used for
accessing the Internet.
— R. v. C.A.H., 2017 BCPC 79, [2017] B.C.J. No. 528.
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Sentencing — Sentencing of a young person for making child pornography available. The
accused had posted 10 images of child pornography to Twitter. Many of the images depicted
children being subjected to violent sexual abuse, which qualified as bodily harm. The offence
was found to be a violent offence pursuant to s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act
(YCJA), and so a custodial sentence was available. However, pursuant to s. 38(2)(i) of the
YCJA, custody was not the least restrictive sentence capable of achieving the purposes of
sentencing in this situation, and so a 2-year term of probation was ordered.
— R. v. G.D., [2017] O.J. No. 2308, 2017 CarswellOnt 6619 (ONCJ).
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Luring a child
172.1 (1) Every person commits an offence who, by a means of telecommunication,
communicates with
(a) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 18 years, for the
purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence with respect to that person
under subsection 153(1), section 155, 163.1, 170, 171 or 279.011 or subsection
279.02(2), 279.03(2), 286.1(2), 286.2(2) or 286.3(2);
(b) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 16 years, for the
purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 151 or 152,
subsection 160(3) or 173(2) or section 271, 272, 273 or 280 with respect to that
person; or
(c) a person who is, or who the accused believes is, under the age of 14 years, for the
purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under section 281 with
respect to that person.
Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not
more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months.
Presumption re age
(3) Evidence that the person referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) was represented to
the accused as being under the age of eighteen years, sixteen years or fourteen years, as
the case may be, is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the accused
believed that the person was under that age.
No defence
(4) It is not a defence to a charge under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) that the accused
believed that the person referred to in that paragraph was at least eighteen years of age,
sixteen years or fourteen years of age, as the case may be, unless the accused took
reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person.
2002, c. 13, s. 8; 2007, c. 20, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 14; 2012, c. 1, s. 22; 2014, c. 25, s. 9; 2015,
c. 23, s. 11.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — The actus reus of s. 172.1(1)(a), (b), and (c) has two elements: 1)
communicating by means of a computer system (as defined by s. 342.1 (1)), and 2) with a
person under the designated age, or with a person the accused believes to be under the
designated age. Where it has been represented to the accused that the person they are
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communicating with is underage, the accused is presumed to have believed that person was in
fact underage. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence the accused took reasonable
steps to ascertain the real age of the person.1 The mens rea of 172.1(a), (b), and (c) is a
specific intent to facilitate the commission of one of the designated offences with the person with
whom the communication is made.2 It is worth noting, however, that this quasi-inchoate offence
may involve some overlap between the actus reus and the mens rea, and distinguishing the two
may not be helpful.3 “Facilitating” includes “helping to bring about” and “making easier or more
probable”. Sexually explicit language may be sufficient to establish this criminal purpose, but is
not necessary.4 The accused need not meet or intend to meet the victim to actually commit the
designated secondary offences, nor must the designated offence have to be factually possible.5
— 1R. v. Levigne, 2010 SCC 25, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 3.
— 2R. v. Alicandro, 2009 ONCA 133, 95 O.R. (3d) 173, leave to appeal refused [2009]
S.C.C.A. No. 395.
— 3R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551, para. 38-39.
— 4R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551.
— 5R. v. Alicandro, 2009 ONCA 133, 95 O.R. (3d) 173, para. 32, leave to appeal refused
[2009] S.C.C.A. No. 395.
*****

Social media case law
Luring a child via Facebook — The accused’s sexual messages and “penis pictures” shared
with the 15-year old complainant via Facebook were for the purpose of facilitating invitation to
sexual touching under s. 152 of the Criminal Code, so he was found guilty of the offence of
luring a child in s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302.
Luring a child via Facebook — The 34-year-old accused was a teacher and house leader at a
private boarding school attended by the 17-year-old complainant. The court ruled their
Facebook communications were for the purpose of facilitating their sexual encounters, which
were previously decided to constitute the offence of sexual exploitation. The accused was
consequently convicted of luring a child.
— R. v. Olson, 2016 BCPC 150, 130 W.C.B. (2d) 664.
Luring a child via Facebook — In determining the accused’s intention in sending Facebook
messages to the complainant, the court noted there were no explicitly sexual messages.
However, considering the uncle-niece context and evidence as a whole, the court found the
“only reasonable conclusion is that the accused was repeatedly communicating with the
[complainant]…to make it easier for him” to have sexual contact with her (para. 108).
— R. v. Skin, 2016 BCSC 2468, 136 W.C.B. (2d) 228.
Luring a child via Facebook — The 19-year-old accused sent sexual messages — including a
picture of his penis — to the 14 and 13-year-old complainants via Facebook and text messages.
This was for the purpose of facilitating invitation to sexual touching under s. 152 of the Criminal
Code, so he was found guilty of two counts of luring a child.
— R. v. M.J.A.H., 2014 ONCJ 31, 111 W.C.B. (2d) 770.
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Luring a child via Facebook — The court found that the accused “sought out a potential victim
when she made a Facebook friend request” of the complainant. The accused’s subsequent
befriending online “fostered a relationship of trust…with a view to advancing the [accused’s]
ultimate goal to procure [the complainant] into prostitution” (para. 114). Consequently, the
accused was found guilty of luring a child.
— R. v. K.O., 2014 ONCJ 277, [2014] O.J. No. 2792.
Luring a child via Facebook — The 40-year-old accused sent sexual messages to “a young
girl” (a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl). The messages were sent for the purpose of
facilitating invitation to sexual touching under s. 152 of the Criminal Code, so the accused was
found guilty of the offence of luring a child.
— R. v. McCall, 2011 BCPC 7, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 573.
Luring a child via Facebook — The accused, who was the brother-in-law of the complainant,
was convicted of two counts of s. 151 sexual interference, s. 152 invitation to touching, and s.
172.1 luring. The luring charge arose from Facebook messages sent in order to arrange
occasions to meet, which gave rise to some of the s. 151 and s. 152 charges. Although only one
count of luring had been charged, the judge found that every separate invitation sent by
Facebook could have supported a distinct charge of luring.
— R. c. F.D., 2013 QCCQ 17822, [2013] J.Q. no 20351, aff’d on other grounds F.D. c. R.,
2016 QCCA 317, 128 W.C.B. (2d) 420.
Sentence reduction for alleged breach of s. 8 rights — Interception of communication —
The accused claimed that the failure of the police to obtain an authorization under s. 184.2 of
the Criminal Code to intercept his communications was a breach of the Charter, an argument
that was accepted on sentencing and led to a 2-month reduction in sentence. On appeal, that
section was found not to apply, as interception requires that the police be acting as a third party
to the communication. Here, the accused was communicating directly with a police officer, albeit
under the pretence that the officer was a 14-year-old girl. When the police made electronic
copies of the communications using a computer program that was not an interception.
— R. v. Mills, 2017 NLCA 12, [2017] N.J. No. 55.
Establishing identity of the accused – Similar fact evidence – The accused was charged
with multiple luring offences, in relation to 15 boys. The Crown argued the accused used two
different fake online identities (on Facebook and MSN) to communicate with the complainants
and entice them into participating in sexual acts for payments. The accused denied all of the
charges, and denied that he had any link to the impugned online profiles. The Crown made a
similar fact application, contending there was striking similarity that established “that the same
person committed all the luring acts in the indictment, and that there was some evidence linking
[the accused] to the acts” (para 198). Accepting this similar fact application, the court found that
the facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused authored the messages from the
Facebook profile (para 419-431). Consequently, he was convicted of the luring charges.
— R. v. McColeman, [2017] O.J. No. 4294, 2017 ONSC 4019
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages — The accused
denied any knowledge of Facebook messages (from an account under his name) sent to an
undercover police officer. The court deemed “there was nothing beyond the messages
themselves and the fragments recovered from the computer to connect the email and chat
messages” to the accused (para. 46). As a result, the charge failed on identity.
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— R. v. Mills (2014), 118 W.C.B. (2d) 207, 359 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 336 (NLPC).
Establishing identity of accused as person who sent Facebook messages — The accused
admitted to the RCMP that he communicated with the complainant on Facebook. The court also
noted the accused’s theory that he did not send the messages “defies logic”, as it “makes no
sense for an unknown third party to impersonate on Facebook [the accused], a person whom
the complainant has known for most of her life” (para. 29).
— R. v. Harris, 2010 PESC 32, 89 W.C.B. (2d) 247.
Reasonable steps to ascertain age of the complainant – After meeting the 13-year-old
complainant in person, the appellant lured him over Facebook. The appellant submitted that he
took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant, and argued a defence of
mistaken belief that the complainant was over 16 years of age. Several factors suggested that
the complainant was of a young age, including: the complainant had a youthful appearance
when the accused first met him, and the complainant’s Facebook profile picture was a photo of
the complainant as a child. The appellant had asked the complainant his age in a Facebook
message, but the complainant did not respond. The appellant took no further steps to ascertain
the complainant’s age. The court found that a reasonable person would have asked more
questions in the circumstances. The court upheld the conviction and dismissed the appeal.
— R. v. Crant, 2018 ONSC 1479
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older —Using fake Skype and
Facebook accounts, an undercover officer posed as a 15-year-old boy interested in the
accused’s Craigslist solicitation for sex from young boys. The court rejected the accused’s
testimony that he believed an adult was using the accounts, in part, because it “would seem an
unlikely prospect for someone just ‘playing a game’ on the internet” to manufacture false
Facebook and Skype accounts (para. 61).
— R. v. Froese, 2015 ONSC 1075, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 577.
Accused’s belief he was communicated with someone older —The accused passed along
personal information to an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Facebook.
This was found to be inconsistent with his belief that he was actually communicating with an
older man who might threaten or extort him. The court also rejected that the accused would
spend hours chatting to an older man out of boredom, since this was inconsistent with the
accused’s purported fear the older man could threaten or extort him.
— R. v. McCall, 2011 BCPC 7, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 573.
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older — The accused’s testimony
as to his belief that the 12-year-old complainant was 18 was not credible. The accused had lied
about his own age on his Facebook profile, and so ought to have known that people lie about
their age on Facebook. The complainant told him she was 16 years or older (“16 ans et plus”),
which was an ambiguous response that should have caused the accused to make further
enquiries. The accused was found to have been wilfully blind as to the age of the complainant.
— Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales c. Rayo, 2017 QCCQ 128, [2017] J.Q.
no 216.
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older — In denying he intended to
communicate with a 13-year-old, the accused claimed children use texting and Facebook more

40

frequently than Internet Relay Chat (IRC), which he was using. Taking the evidence as a whole,
the court rejected the accused’s argument.
— R. v. R.J.S., 2010 NSSC 253, 88 W.C.B. (2d) 694.
Accused’s belief he was communicating with someone older — The accused
communicated with an undercover officer who was posing as a 15-year-old girl via Craigslist
and Facebook. The accused also recorded his thoughts about the exchanges in a private word
processing document. During their conversations, the accused had expressed some
equivocation about his belief that the complainant was underage, and about the activities they
might engage in, but the private document was convincing evidence that he believed the
complainant was 15, and that he intended to facilitate sexual contact with her.
— R. v. Drury, 2017 ONSC 2330, [2017] O.J. No. 2002.
Use and deactivation of Facebook account by accused — “This deactivation [of the
accused’s Facebook account] and the numerous cell phone message deletions are more than
coincidental and infer a current or very recent effort to destroy evidence. The accused's
argument that someone else may have used his email account is a statement made without any
air of reality” (paras. 215-6).
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302.
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The complainant’s mother printed
out Facebook messages between the complainant and the accused’s alleged Facebook
account, then provided them to the police. The court ruled the Facebook conversations were
provided without any state action and thus immune from Charter scrutiny.
— R. v. Lowrey, 2016 ABPC 131, 40 Alta. L.R. (6th) 163.
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence —The complainant consented to the
police taking over her Facebook account for investigative purposes. The accused argued the
extraction of information from this Facebook investigation breached his s. 8 rights. For a variety
of reasons, the court deemed his expectation of privacy unreasonable, and thus s. 8 was not
engaged. Even if this expectation of privacy analysis was incorrect, the complainant had
consented to a search of her Facebook account, and thus the search and seizure was
undertaken with lawful authorization. Therefore, there was no s. 8 violation.
— R. v. Lowrey, 2016 ABPC 131, 40 Alta. L.R. (6th) 163.
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The court applied section 31.1 of
the Canada Evidence Act to copies of Facebook messages the accused sent to a victim, which
were used as evidence at trial. The victim’s review of the copies and testimony that the copies
were accurate was found to be capable of supporting the authenticity of evidence, as section
31.1 requires.
— R. v. J.S.M., 2015 NSSC 312, 127 W.C.B. (2d) 90.
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The police took screen captures of
the accused’s Facebook profile, and of their communications with the accused while they were
undercover. The court ruled the screen captures were admissible and “more akin to a photo or
real evidence” than to officer’s investigative notes. Thus, s. 30(10) of the Canada Evidence Act
did not apply to them.
— R. v. Mills, 118 W.C.B. (2d) 207, 359 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 336 (NLPC).
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Facebook messages as evidence of sexual intention – The accused sent many Facebook
messages of a sexual nature to the 13-year-old complainant. The court accepted these
Facebook messages as evidence of the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant and the
accused’s hope of establishing a sexual relationship.
— R. v. Dawe, 2018 CarswellNfld 205
Seizure of evidence – The appellant was arrested at the door to his apartment. The arresting
officers accompanied him into his home, and one officer observed an open computer which
displayed an open Facebook page listing the appellant’s email address. The page read “Your
account has been deactivated”. The officer seized the computer. The appellant argued that this
was a breach of his s 8 rights under the Charter, as the officers did not have a search warrant.
The court concluded that, under s. 489(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, officers are entitled to seize
items they believe constitute evidence of the offence. As the computer was open and in plain
view, the officers were entitled to seize it.
— R. v. A.H., 2018 ONCA 677
Collection of evidence from Facebook – The appeal court addressed the process used to
obtain information from Facebook, and how it relates to trial delay. Here, the Crown was
required to engage Canada’s Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, and
requested an administrative subpoena of Facebook for IP addresses, email addresses, aliases,
and chat messages. The court held that, while the resulting delay constituted institutional delay,
it was not extraordinary delay requiring special treatment. Still, the court emphasized that when
the Crown engages the assistance of the US using the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, the
Crown is expected to oversee the process and make efforts to minimize undue delay.
— R. v. Kaulback, 2018 NLCA 8
Charter rights during undercover police investigations on Facebook — The police posed
as underage girls and communicated with the accused via Facebook and email. They used a
computer program to record these conversations, and extracted information to run checks on
the accused in the CPIC and ICAN databases. The police did not have authorization for these
activities under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code or through a general warrant. This, added to the
accused’s expectation of privacy to his email and Facebook, meant the police’s actions
breached the accused’s s. 8 rights. The court also expressed unease that the police’s
undercover account had “friended” other people (some minors), whose identities “were in effect
conscripted into surveillance” without consent (para. 39).
— R. v. Mills (2013), 110 W.C.B. (2d) 408, 343 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 128 (NLPC).
— See contra, R. v. N.J.S, 2014 BCSC 2658, [2014] B.C.J. No. 3504, para. 70, where the
court distinguished Mills and held: “In my opinion, e-mails that have been sent and
received between individuals who are unknown to each other do not fall within the
definition of electronic communications found in s. 183 of the Code”.
Constitutionality of mandatory minimum penalty — The court created and considered a
reasonable hypothetical of a 19-year-old using a smartphone to solicit a 16-year-old for nude
photos. Without any argument from counsel, the court concluded a 90-day jail sentence would
not be grossly disproportionate for this situation. It expressed “significant hesitation and
reluctance” making this judgement, and noted “on a more complete record, it may well be
determined that the 90-day minimum jail sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offence
described” (paras. 71-73).
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— R. v. S.S., 2014 ONCJ 184, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 160.
Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s.
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161.1(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section
161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906.
Appropriate remedy for destruction of evidence — To create space on the forensic server,
the police deleted imaged hard drives of the complainant and accused’s computer. As a result
of this negligent failure to preserve and disclose evidence, the accused was unable to mount a
full answer and defence. The court granted a stay of proceedings.
— R. v. Kelly, 1109 A.P.R. 123, 118 W.C.B. (2d) 25 (NLSC).
Charter s. 11(b) Jordan application for judicial stay of proceedings based on delay in
disclosure — 18 months were required in order for the Crown to make full disclosure of
materials obtained via analysis of the accused’s computer and a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT) request to the United States in order to obtain information from Facebook. It was
found to be unreasonable to expect the accused to make an election or hold a preliminary
inquiry before this essential disclosure was received, and it was noted that only one of the
accused’s elections was done with the benefit of full disclosure, and so no delay could be
attributed to the accused’s three (re-)elections. Part of the delay was attributed to a single
civilian police employee having responsibility for all computer forensic work required on this
matter, as well as an incomplete initial response received from Facebook that delayed the
MLAT process by a total of 18 months. A stay was granted as a remedy for a breach of the
accused’s Charter s. 11(b) to trial without delay, pursuant to R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016]
1 S.C.R. 631.
— R. v. Kaulback, [2017] C.C.S. No. 1444, 2017 CanLII 7095 (NLPC).
Sentencing –The accused lured six victims, all girls between 12 and 14 years old, using
Snapchat. He coerced his victims into sending him nude photographs, which he saved and
stored on his iPhone. In the sentencing decision, the court considered the fact that he never had
a face-to-face meeting with any of his victims, finding that he did not demonstrate any intention
to commit a sexual act with them. The court stated that this was not a mitigating factor, but
instead removed from consideration factors that would otherwise justify a longer term of
imprisonment.
— R. v. Kron, 2018 ONCJ 622
Sentencing – The Canadian offender communicated with four young girls in the United
Kingdom for the purpose of committing sexual offences against them. He used Instagram and
another social media platform called “ooVoo”. In a victim impact statement, one victim
discussed the social isolation she faced following the offences. She explained that her friends
would exclude her from certain conversations because they knew her parents monitored her
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accounts. The court took victim impact into account in sentencing, noting that “One can hardly
comprehend the impact that Mr. Carter's actions will have upon [one of the victims] and her
family as she grows older.”
— R. v. Carter, 2018 CarswellNfld 28, para 53
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to internet luring. “The Court of Appeal has emphasized
that the sentences imposed for online child luring must serve to safeguard children who are
indefatigable users of the Internet from those predators who would abuse this technology to lure
them into situations where they can be sexually exploited and abused.” As such, this crime
ordinarily demands a custodial sentence. The judge imposed a s. 161(1) order, including a
prohibition on “using the Internet, or any similar communication service, to access any content
that violates the law or to directly or indirectly access any social media sites, social network,
Internet discussion forum or chat room, or maintain a personal profile on any such service (for
example Facebook, Twitter, Tinder, Instagram or any equivalent or similar service).”
— R. v. Gucciardi, [2017] O.J. No. 5974, 2017 ONCJ 770, para 45, 74
Sentencing – The accused pled guilty to possession of child pornography and internet luring.
The accused had created a fake Facebook identity to persuade an 11-year-old girl to engage in
sexually explicit conversation, and send him sexually explicit pictures of herself. He also sent
her pictures of an adult penis. Though the accused characterized his actions as a “stupid
decision”, the court rejected this narrative and emphasized a high moral culpability. Specifically,
the court noted the accused “was involved in the internet luring of a child through a medium in
which children are particularly susceptible to influence because of the importance it plays in
their daily lives: Facebook. To use Facebook in this manner illustrates a commitment to the
commission of a sexual offence against a child which is alarming.”
— R. v. Clarke, [2017] N.J. No. 230, 2017 NLPC 1317A00102, para 88
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of luring a child. Since his s. 8 Charter rights were
violated during an undercover Facebook investigation, his sentence was reduced. A request for
a stay of proceedings was rejected.
— R. v. Mills, 1136 A.P.R. 237, 120 W.C.B. (2d) 235 (NLPC).
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual assault, prostitution of a person less than 18
years old, failure to comply with a recognizance, and luring a child. Among other things, the
sentencing judge prohibited the accused from Internet use for 20 years, and from owning or
using any mobile device with Internet capabilities. The Court of Appeal deemed this order as
unnecessary for advancing the objective of protecting children, given the Internet may be
required for a “myriad or innocent and perhaps unavoidable activities” (para. 26). Furthermore,
“Section 161(1)(d) permits the courts to prohibit Internet use but does not provide the court with
the power to restrict ownership of such Internet capable devices” (para. 27). The replacement
order included a 20-year prohibition of using a computer to communicate with a person under
16 years old, except for immediate family members, and prohibited Internet use “or any similar
communication service to…directly or indirectly access any social media sites, social network,
Internet discussion forum, or chat room, or maintain a personal profile on any such service,”
including Facebook (para. 29).
— R. v. Brar, 2016 ONCA 724, 134 O.R. (3d) 103.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, possession of child pornography, and
11 counts of extortion. The terms of his 18-month probation included, among other things: not
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possessing or using any computer or other device that has Internet access, except with
advance written permission; monitored use of Internet access, if granted; and the accused’s
identification by his full real name when communicating with anyone by means including
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or any other social network.
— R. v. R.W., 2016 ONCJ 325, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 68.
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of luring a child. The accused’s creation of three
false Facebook identities for luring was deemed “alarming and frightening” (para. 75), especially
since Facebook is a “medium in which children are particularly susceptible to influence because
of the importance it plays in their daily lives” (para. 79). The court concluded both Crown and
defense sentencing submissions did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence.
Among other things, the court imposed a 10-year prohibition of using the Internet or other digital
network to contact any person under 18 years of age, except the two children he lived with.
— R. v. M.C., 2016 CanLII 83, 127 W.C.B. (2d) 435 (NLPC).
Sentencing — Crown appeal of sentence. The accused’s use of the Internet to lure was a
serious aggravating factor that justified at least a three-year sentence of imprisonment.
However, the appropriate global sentence of three-and-one-half years’ imprisonment was not
imposed, because of the lengthy delay of more than one-and-a-half years beyond what was
usual for a substantive appeal.
— R. v. Hajar, 2014 ABCA 222, 577 A.R. 57.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child and breaching probation. Among other
things, the court imposed a 10-year supervision order, which included prohibiting possession or
use of any device with Internet access, or accessing any other digital network, without advance
written permission of the supervisor.
— R. v. Slade, 2015 ONCJ 8, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 533.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child. Among other things, the court imposed
a 12-month probation order, which included prohibiting the accused from owning, possessing,
accessing, or using a device that can access the Internet, except for employment, education, or
other purposes after obtaining written permission from a probation officer.
— R. v. M.G.P., 2015 SKPC 80, 477 Sask. R. 263.
Sentencing —The accused pled guilty to luring a child and distributing sexually explicit material
to a child. The court noted his sexual Facebook messaging to three girls lacked “the
sophistication and predatory anonymity of many offenders”; this was one reason the court was
less willing to find the accused should be separated from society for a long time (paras. 73, 78).
Among other things, the court imposed a probation order, which included conditions not to
possess or use any device that access the internet, except with prior written permission; if
permission is given, the accused must provide passwords and allow monitoring.
— R. v. Callahan-Smith, 2015 YKTC 3, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 417.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child and making sexually explicit material
available to a child. Among other things, the court imposed a three-year probation period,
including conditions of not possessing any device capable of accessing the Internet, and not
using any electronic device to access chat rooms or social networking sites.
— R. v. Smith, 2014 ONCJ 543, 116 W.C.B. (2d) 655.
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Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. An aggravating
factor was his Internet use, which amounted to a “virtual home invasion” and was “specifically
designed to evade any parental oversight” (para. 17). Among other things, the court imposed a
3-year probation period, including prohibition of contact in person or by means of
telecommunication, with anyone under the age of 16 (unless supervised by an appropriate
person).
— R. v. Hajar, 2014 ABQB 550, 116 W.C.B. (2d) 655.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and
luring a child. Among other things, the court imposed a s. 161 prohibition order for life, which
included a prohibition on using the Internet or other digital network, unless for employment,
seeking employment, or education.
— R. v. Stanley, [2014] O.J. No. 6378, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 419 (ONCJ).
Sentencing — The developmentally-delayed accused pled guilty to offences of luring a child
and breach of recognizance. Among other things, the court imposed a 15-month probation
period that required him not to use the Internet or other digital network, unless under the
supervision and in the immediate presence of an adult.
— R. v. S.S., 2014 ONCJ 184, 113 W.C.B. (2d) 160.
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on
children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment, emphasizing the
sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and dismissed the accused’s
argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18).
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. Citing a report
from the Sentencing Council for England and Wales, the court notes that exchange of “sexual
images” of a victim (in this case, over Facebook) is an aggravating factor (para. 11).
— R. v. Nightingale, 1030 A.P.R. 60, 104 W.C.B. (2d) 1235 (NLPC).
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to sexual interference and luring a child. The accused’s
Facebook messages to the victim were used as evidence to show the accused’s manipulative
behaviour and high risk for future sexual misconduct. The court thus emphasized the principles
of denunciation and deterrence. Among other things, the court imposed a 3-year probation order
that included a prohibition of owning, touching, or possessing any computer system or any other
device capable of accessing the Internet.
— R. v. Lamb, 2013 BCPC 137, 107 W.C.B. (2d) 199.

46

Sentencing — The accused was found guilty after a jury trial of luring a child. The majority of
the communication occurred on an online dating site, as well as by text message and Facebook
chat. Sentencing was conducted on the basis of the provisions of s. 172.1 before the
introduction of a mandatory minimum. The fact that the complainant was a real young person,
as opposed to fictitious, as where undercover police engage the accused, was considered
aggravating.
— R. c. Allard, 2014 NBBR 261, 118 W.C.B. (2d) 430 (NBQB).
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to counts of s. 151 sexual interference, and s. 172.1
luring. The Crown appealed against a 90-day intermittent sentence given by the trial judge,
arguing for a 15-18 month range. On appeal, the defence maintained the original sentence was
appropriate. The court confirmed the trial judge’s identification, as an aggravating factor, of a
pattern of manipulation, moving from the virtual to the real. The court described inappropriate
chat messages and sharing of intimate photos, which occurred mostly on an adult dating
website, but also via Facebook, as a prelude to the sexual touching. The court also found that
the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the importance of premeditation, in the form of
grooming the victim via the luring offence, as a predicate to the sexual interference (paras. 5052). The court found that the absence of violence, other than the inherent violence of the
offence, was not a mitigating factor (para. 56).
— R. c. Bergeron, 2013 QCCA 7, 110 W.C.B. (2d) 784.
Sentencing — The accused plead guilty to one count each of s. 172.1 luring, s. 151 sexual
interference, and s. 152 invitation to sexual touching. The serious touching offences were
planned in detail via Facebook messages, giving rise to the charge of luring. The court found
that the fact that the victim was between 15 and 16 at the time of commission of the offence was
not a mitigating factor. Relying on R. c. Arbut, 2009 QCCA 46, [2009] J.Q. no 150, the court
found that the sentence for the luring offence should be consecutive to any sentence for the
ultimate sexual interference or invitation to touching offences, but with consideration for the
totality principle. A global sentence of 27 months, with 12 months for the luring offence, and 15
consecutive months for the interference and invitation offences, was ordered.
— R. c. Fortin, 2015 QCCQ 1369, [2015] J.Q. no 1513.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to one count each of luring and sexual interference.
Thousands of messages had been exchanged by text message, Facebook, and Skype. A 14
month sentence was imposed, with 11 months for luring, and three months consecutive for the
sexual inference, which were the sentences sought by the crown. The fact that the luring had
proceeded to physical contact was an aggravating factor for sentencing on the luring offence.
There was extensive discussion of the totality principle as well as a finding that, even if they
might be part of the same “criminal adventure”, these two offences are sufficiently distinct so as
not to offend the rule in R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 SCR 729.
— R. v. Dominaux (2017), 136 W.C.B. (2d) 218, [2017] N.J. No. 16 (NLPC).
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of possessing child pornography, and luring. The
offences related to the sending of a single photo by the complainant to the accused. The
accused had gone too far in what was a misguided attempt to relate to a young person who
faced similar difficulties to those faced by the accused during his youth in the same community.
The accused was Aboriginal, posed no risk of recidivism, and had been on highly restrictive bail
conditions without breaches for 5 years. The sentencing proceeded on the provisions as they
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stood in 2011, with no minimum for the luring, and 14 days for the child pornography. The
accused was sentenced to 60 days intermittent on the child pornography charge, and a 9 month
conditional sentence on the luring charge.
— R. v. Crant, 2017 ONCJ 192, [2017] O.J. No. 1493.
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Indecent acts
173 (1) Everyone who wilfully does an indecent act in a public place in the presence of
one or more persons, or in any place with intent to insult or offend any person,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not
more than two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than six months.
Exposure
(2) Every person who, in any place, for a sexual purpose, exposes his or her genital
organs to a person who is under the age of 16 years
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not
more than two years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
90 days; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than six months and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of 30 days.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 173; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 7; 2008, c. 6, s. 54; 2010, c. 17,
s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 23.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — s. 173(1) — “Indecent act” and “public place” is defined in s. 150 of the
Criminal Code. “Public place” should be understood as any place to which the public have
physical, as opposed to simply visual, access.1 An indecent act does not require a sexual
context; instead, it should be assessed on the community standard of tolerance test.2 This
offence is made out when either: (i) the accused wilfully does an indecent act in a public place in
the presence of one or more persons other than the accused; or (ii) the accused does an
indecent act in any place with a specific intent to insult or offend any person. Regarding (i),
there is conflicting jurisprudence as to whether “wilfully” applies merely to the indecent act, or
also to the requirement that the act be done in a public place in the presence of one or more
people.3 That an unmonitored video camera observes the acts, or another person was involved
in the act, does not satisfy the requirement that the act was performed in the presence of one or
more persons.4
— 1R. v. Clark, 2005 SCC 2, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 6.
— 2R. v. Jacob, [1996] 31 O.R. (3d) 350, 142 DLR (4th) 411 (ONCA).
— 3R. v. Sloan, [1994] 18 O.R. (3d) 143, 70 O.A.C. 357 (ONCA), (Galligan J.A. finding
willfulness applies to both elements, Osborne J.A. finding that it applies only to the
commission or performance of the act, and Goodman J.A. taking no position on this
issue); R. c. Mailhot (1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 376, 31 W.C.B. (2d) 466 (QCCA), (preferring
the position of Galligan J.A. in Sloan that both the act, and its being done in the presence
of another, must be willful).
— 4R. v. Follett (1994), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 435, 24 W.C.B. (2d) 456 (NLSC), affd in R. v. Follett
(1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 493, 27 W.C.B. (2d) 413 (NLCA).
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Essential elements — s. 173(2) — “Indecent act” is defined in s. 150 of the Criminal Code.
Mere nudity, without a degree of “moral turpitude”, will not suffice.1 “In any place” refers to the
location where the accused exposes himself; there is no requirement the accused and victim be
in the same place when the offence is committed. As such, this section applies to images sent
over the Internet.2
— 1R. v. Beaupre (1971), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 320, [1971] B.C.J. No. 607, para. 6 (BCSC).
— 2R. v. Alicandro, 2009 ONCA 133, 95 O.R. (3d) 173, leave to appeal refused [2009]
S.C.C.A. No. 395.
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of the complainant is no defence to,
among others, an offence under s. 173(2). This limitation is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.1
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA).
*****

Social media case law
Exposure of genitals for sexual purpose to a person under 16 years of age via Facebook
— On the facts, the accused was acquitted of this offence because the Crown failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the “penis picture” allegedly sent by the accused via Facebook
was of his genital organs. “If the accused sent pictures of someone else's penis he would not
have violated the section” (para. 199).
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302.
Constitutionality of retrospective application of s. 161(1) amendments — The 2012 s.
161(1) amendments empower sentencing judges to prohibit sexual offenders from having any
contact with a person under 16 years of age (s. 161.1(1)(c)), or from using the Internet or other
digital networks (s. 161(1)(d)). The Supreme Court found that these amendments constitute
punishment, and thus retrospectively applying them violates s. 11 of the Charter. Retrospective
application of the s. 161(1)(c) contact provision fails the cost-benefit stage of the Oakes test, but
retrospective application of the s. 161(1)(d) internet prohibition is saved by s. 1. Section
161(1)(d) is directed at “grave, emerging harms precipitated by a rapidly evolving social and
technological context”. Furthermore, an “Internet prohibition, while invasive, is not among the
most onerous punishments, such as increased incarceration” (para. 114).
— R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906.
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Criminal harassment
264 (1) No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is
harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct
referred to in subsection (2) that causes that other person reasonably, in all the
circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.
Prohibited conduct
(2) The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of
(a) repeatedly following from place to place the other person or anyone known to
them;
(b) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, the other person or
anyone known to them;
(c) besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the other person, or
anyone known to them, resides, works, carries on business or happens to be; or
(d) engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of
their family.
Punishment
(3) Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten
years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Factors to be considered
(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, the court imposing the
sentence on the person shall consider as an aggravating factor that, at the time the
offence was committed, the person contravened
(a) the terms or conditions of an order made pursuant to section 161 or a
recognizance entered into pursuant to section 810, 810.1 or 810.2; or
(b) the terms or conditions of any other order or recognizance made or entered into
under the common law or a provision of this or any other Act of Parliament or of a
province that is similar in effect to an order or recognizance referred to in
paragraph (a).
Reasons
(5) Where the court is satisfied of the existence of an aggravating factor referred to in
subsection (4), but decides not to give effect to it for sentencing purposes, the court
shall give reasons for its decision.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 264; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 37; 1993, c. 45, s. 2; 1997, c. 16,
s. 4, c. 17, s. 9; 2002, c. 13, s. 10.
*****
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General case law
Essential elements — The elements of the actus reus are: 1) the accused engaged in conduct
prohibited by s. 264(2)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Code; 2) the complainant was harassed; 3) the
prohibited conduct caused the complainant to fear for their or another’s safety; and 4) the
complainant’s fear was reasonable. The mens rea is knowledge of, wilful blindness, or
recklessness as to whether the complainant was harassed.1 “Repeatedly” under s. 264(2)(a)
and (b) means more than once,2 but not necessarily more than twice.3 A charge under s.
264(1)(d) can be supported based on a single incident, unlike ss. 264(1)(a) and (b).4 An
accused’s conduct may be contrary to s. 264(2)(d) without spoken words.5 The Kienapple
principle may preclude multiple convictions for criminal harassment and uttering threats.6
— 1R. v. Sillipp, 1997 ABCA 346, 209 A.R. 253; R. v. Kosikar, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 138
C.C.C. (3d) (ONCA); R. c. Lamontagne, 129 C.C.C. (3d) 181, 39 W.C.B. (2d) 546 (QCCA); R.
v. Sanchez, 2012 BCCA 469, 99 C.R. (6th) 180.
— 2R. v. Ryback, 71 B.C.A.C. 175, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (BCCA).
— 3R. v. Ohenhen, 77 O.R. (3d) 570, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (ONCA).
— 4R. v. Kosikar (1999), 178 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 138 C.C.C. (3d) (ONCA), para. 15-17; R. v.
Hawkins, 2006 BCCA 498, 233 B.C.A.C. 7, at para. 19-20.
— 5R. v. Kohl (2009), 94 O.R. (3d) 241, 241 CCC (3d) 284 (ONCA).
— 6R. v. Hawkins, 2006 BCCA 498, 233 B.C.A.C. 7.
Defining harassment — To prove harassment, it is not sufficient that the complainant was
annoyed or disquieted; instead, the complainant must have felt “tormented, troubled, worried
continually or chronically, plagued, bedeviled and badgered”.1 These words do not replace the
word “harassed” in the Code, nor is it necessary that a complainant experience all of these
feelings cumulatively to be harassed.2 Harassment is not restricted to its “classical” sense of
repeated minor attacks, and can include bothering the complainant with repeated demands,
solicitations, or incitements. Harassment can be bothersome by reason principally of its
continuity or repetitive nature.3
— 1R. v. Kosikar, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 138 C.C.C. (3d) 217 (ONCA), paras. 24-5.
— 2R. v. Kordrostami, 47 O.R. (3d) 788, 143 C.C.C. (3d) 488 (ONCA).
— 3R. c. Lamontagne, 129 C.C.C. (3d) 181, 39 W.C.B. (2d) 546 (ONCA), para. 28.
Charter concerns — Assuming the provisions of s. 264 infringe the right to freedom of
expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter, the infringement is justified by s. 1 of the
Charter. S. 264 also does not violate s. 7 of the Charter for being impermissibly vague, or
allowing the morally innocent to be punished.
— 1R. v. Sillipp, 1997 ABCA 346, 209 A.R. 253; R. v. Krushel (2000), 130 O.A.C. 160, 142
C.C.C. (3d) 1 (ONCA).
*****

Social media case law
Definition of “Doxing” —“Doxing” involves publishing on the Internet identifiable personal
information about an individual that has usually been obtained from social media sites and from
hacking into private systems. Depending on the nature of the information, its disclosure can
cause the victim distress, fear, embarrassment and shame. The personal information can be
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used by others to facilitate identity theft and fraud. The threat to publish private information can
also be used by the person who holds the information for extortion and blackmail purposes.”
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 3.
Definition of “Swatting” —“Swatting involves tricking an emergency service agency into
dispatching an emergency response based on a false report of an ongoing critical incident.
Swatting can lead to the deployment of a range of emergency response teams including police,
fire and bomb squads and the evacuation of businesses, schools or other public institutions.”
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 4.
Not objectively reasonable — Blocking on social media, in this case twitter, may not be
enough to convey that an individual has been harassed.
— R v. Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35.
Not objectively reasonable — The accused continuously sent threatening messages via
Facebook and text message. The accused’s claim that the complainant’s subjective feeling of
harassment resulted from a misinterpretation of the Facebook message was not credible.
— R. v. Richner, 2017 QCCQ 3095.
Not objectively reasonable — Accused posted various threatening materials against the
complaint (his ex-wife) on Facebook. Court found that none of the material can be considered
threatening in themselves. Given that the accused also blocked the complainant, the court held
that there could be no harassment until the complainant decided to use another person’s
account to view the accused’s profile.
— R. v. Corby, 2012 BCPC 561.
Not objectively reasonable — Accused commented “Good get the bitch out of there before I
bomb her” when she tweeted a CTV article “Pauline Marois ready to call an election” (para 2).
Accused acquitted of criminal harassment as the Crown failed to establish that then Premier of
Quebec feared for her safety or anyone known to her.
— R. v. Le Seelleur, 2014 QCCQ 12216.
Not objectively reasonable — Accused asked complainant twice over Facebook to show him
her breasts, allegedly sent her pornographic pictures over email, and stared at her chest during
family gatherings. Complainant blocked him on Facebook and deleted him from MSN. Court
neither found complainant credible nor found that such fear would have been reasonable.
— R. v. Doyle, 2009 NSPC 56.
Objectively reasonable — The accused was convicted of criminal harassment due to emails,
text messages, and Facebook messages sent to the complainant. Just a smiley face, the court
found, can trigger objectively reasonable paranoia regarding “how far the accused was willing to
go” (para 18).
— R. v. Alotaibi (2013), OJ No 2473, 109 WCB (2d) 111.
Objectively reasonable — Accused sent numerous Facebook messages from his personal
account and two other fake accounts. The court accepted that it was the Accused sending
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messages from the fake accounts, given the consistency of tenor and content. Complainant’s
threat found to be reasonable, in part, because one message was read as a threat.
— R. v. Amiri, [2015] O.J. No. 5256.
Objectively reasonable — In granting the Crown’s application for witness accommodation, the
court accepted that the Crown’s argument “that the circumstances surrounding the alleged
offence, being through a communication by way of Facebook, are supportive of the view that
direct confrontation of the witness by the accused in the courtroom will cause the witness
unacceptable stress and anxiety” (para. 16)
— R. v. O’Hare, 2017 BCPC 118.
Objectively reasonable — Accused sent SnapChat messages threatening to shoot up two
schools. The few students who received personal messages of “RIP” also felt especially
threatened (para 7). Two schools had to take additional security measures and parents feared
for their children’s lives. The principal of Eastdale Collegiate also claimed in his Victim Impact
Statement that “students are afraid to come to school, have lost instructional time, and have
required counselling” (para 23).
— R. v. Richardson, [2018] O.J. No 1452.
Objectively reasonable — RM and SH (motorcyclists) were harassed through social media/
email/ in-person by Mr. James, who is a member of the Bacchus Motorcycle Club. James, for
instance, sent the following Facebook message to RM when he was out-of-town: “will see you
as soon as you get back. Don’t waste your dollars on any souvenirs” (para 37). Judge claimed
that: “I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, looking at all the circumstances, Mr. James
was effectively saying to RM: “you, and your family, are at risk of suffering serious bodily harm”
(para 177).
— R. v. Howe, [2018] N.S.J. No. 281.
Objectively reasonable — Hirsch posted a nude photo of his ex-girlfriend and uttered a threat
along with the photo, namely that he would choke his ex-girlfriend and end it with a shotgun
shell. Accused sentenced to 6-months incarceration and 12 months probation; sentence upheld
on appeal.
— R. v. Hirsch, [2017] S.J. No. 59, 2017 SKCA 14.
Objectively reasonable — Ernest Stewart began messaging his ex-girlfriend and her current
partner. After Stewart was blocked, he hacked his ex-girlfriend’s Facebook account and sent the
following messages to the victim’s current partner: “don't be coming around because Ernest will
be anal with his actions like Texas Chainsaw” (para 3). He also messaged, I hope somebody
don't fall over the wharf and crack their skull, I've seen it before, Accidents Happen” (para 3).
Judge sentenced Stewart to an adjusted global sentence of 30 months which included 6 months
for criminal harassment.
— R. v. Stewart, [2018] N.J. No. 76.
Objectively reasonable — Accused repeatedly harassed victim on social media (namely
Facebook), thereby causing victim to reasonably fear for her safety. One of the messages, for
instance, claimed: “Tell your mom that if she doesn't fucking straighten out, she will be fucking
drug (sic) behind a truck" (para 54).
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— R. v. Lauck, [2018] A.J. No. 1312.
Objectively reasonable — Mr. R separated from his wife, Ms. R. Mr. R concluded that his wife
had an affair with Mr. A. In response, Mr. R messaged Mr. A’s wife (Ms. A), informing her of the
affair and threatening to harm her husband. Many acts of harassment were ensued against Ms.
R and Mr. A, including on Twitter, e-mail, Google Review, and voicemail.
— R. v. J.R., [2018] O.J. No. 6409.
Evidence — Section 8 of the Charter was not breached by the police (1) receiving emails from
[the accused’s email address] directed to the email address created by the police; (2) obtaining
screen captures of emails allegedly composed by the accused; or (3) obtaining subscriber
information from Shaw Communications relating to the I.P. address of the emails received by
the police. Consequently, the screen captures, all the email transactions in question, and the
PIPEDA requests and responses were admitted into evidence.
— R v Labrentz, 2010 ABPC 11.
Evidence — Proof of the Tweets sent by the accused and their content comprise the entire
case on the act of repeated communications. The detective used the Sysomos software to
obtain electronic records of the tweets, part of which is not available on the public platform.
Court found there is sufficient corroborating evidence proving the accused sent the tweets and
no reason to question the reliability of the Sysomos software used.
— R. v. Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35.
Evidence — The accused was convicted of criminal harassment, in part due to a large number
of Facebook messages sent from his personal account and two other fake Facebook accounts.
The court accepted that the accused sent the Facebook messages from the fake Facebook
accounts, given the consistency of tenor and content of these messages with the accused’s text
messages and in-person interactions with the complainant.
— R. v. Amiri, [2015] O.J. No. 5256.
Sentencing — Aggravating factors were the serious impacts that the social media posts had on
the communities: Two schools had to go on shut down as a result of the accused’s posts
threatening to shoot down the school. Another aggravating factor is that the student was warned
when he was 16 for similar posts and was offered counselling, but he declined.
— R. v. Richardson, [2018] O.J. No 1452.
Sentencing — Abusing/ assaulting a (common law) partner was an aggravating factor as per
section 718.2(a)(ii). The fact that accused did not post the video of the victim having sexual
intercourse with another man, but only sent it to the victim’s friend, decreased the seriousness
of the crime.
— R. v. Greene, [2018] N.J. No. 95.
Sentencing — The court held that general deterrence and denunciation are primary
considerations when individuals use social media to criminally harass others. “It is imperative
that the community at large get the message that using social media to criminally harass
another person will not be tolerated and that serious repercussions will ensue for those who
engage in it” (para 27).
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— R. v. Gardner, [2018] N.J. No. 243.
Sentencing — The accused, a talented young pianist, posted his ex-girlfriend’s nude photos on
a pornographic website without her consent. He was charged with criminal harassment and pled
guilty. Court noted his excellent antecedent record and high rehabilitation potential, but refused
to exercise its discharge discretion under s. 730(1), stating the best interest of the accused is
outweighed by the sentencing objectives of denunciation and general deterrence “given the
affront to the high value society places on human dignity and privacy within the context of close
intimate relationships.” (para. 28). A 12-month non-reporting probation was imposed.
— R. v. B.Z. (Zhou), 2016 ONCJ 547.
Sentencing (Prohibition on Social Media Use) — Court found the accused’s conduct had a
life-changing and serious effect on the victim and her family, and that the accused had little
appreciation for the impact of his conduct. In sentencing him to 18 months incarceration
additional to the 5-months spent in pre-trial detention, the Court imposed a 3-year probation
order, which included a prohibition from accessing the internet and not being in possession of
any electronic device with capacity to access to the internet.
— R. v. Cholin, 2010 BCPC 417.
Sentencing (Prohibition on Social Media Use) — The accused (a youth) sent a number of
threatening Facebook messages to his ex-girlfriend, in the context of other abusive and criminal
conduct. Court found his behaviour exhibited a “complete breakdown in respect for others”,
particularly the three victims (para. 57). The sentence was a 6-month deferred custody and
supervision order and a 15-month probation, under the conditions that the accused immediately
delete his social media accounts.
— R. v. C.L., 2014 NSPC 79.
Sentencing (Review Board) — Layne and & Deneeka were involved in an intimate
relationship, Daneeka no longer wanted contact. Layne nonetheless contacted Deneeka by
phone, text message, and Facebook. Layne’s current diagnosis is schizophrenia and cannbis
abuse disorder. Review board concluded that Layne continued to pose a significant threat to the
safety of the community, and he received a conditional discharge disposition, subject to
conditions, including he not cohabit with Daneeka.
— Layne (Re) (2018), O.R.B.D. No. 1211.
Sentencing (Review Board) — The board, in agreement with the hospital, agreed “that a
detention order is both necessary and appropriate at this early stage of Ms. Fournier’s treatment
and rehabilitation (para 21). Review board found Ms. Fournier’s threats against a Crown
attorney, which she posted on Facebook, was due to her delusions, which have been ongoing
for 18 years.
— Fournier (Re) (2018), O.R.B.D. No. 53.
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — The accused, diagnosed with Asperger's
Disorder, was found NCR on account of mental disorder on two counts of criminal harassment
in 2013. He has since been detained at the hospital.
— Baynham-McColl (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 120.
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Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Accused found Not Criminally Responsible
after repeated interactions on Facebook and other mediums with victim. Accused diagnosed
with a delusional disorder. The court did not make a Disposition but deferred the matter to the
Ontario Review Board. “Board satisfied that that Mr. McCormick poses a risk of serious physical
or psychological harm to members of the public and should be subject to a detention
Disposition.” (para 40).
— McCormick (Re) (2018), O.R.B.D. No. 2970.
Not criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Teresa Lidguerre was found NCR on charges
of uttering death threats against PM Justin Trudeau and uttering death threats against
unspecified persons and PM Justin Trudeau. Under s. 672.47, the court did not make a
disposition but remanded the accused to the Ontario Review Board. Given Ms. Lidguerre’s
severe mental illness of schizophrenia, her reintegration into society and other needs, as well as
the paramount consideration of public safety, the Board issued a detention order under s.
672.54.
— Lidguerre (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 630, 2017 CarswellOnt 4315.
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Carpio was found NCR on charges of criminal
harassment, uttering threats, and breach of recognizance, and was made subject to the
dispositions of the Ontario Review Board. He was diagnosed as psychotic disorder NOS with at
least three years of history and potential to relapse into substance abuse. Accordingly, the
Board found he has met the test for significant risk and should continue to be detained.
— Carpio (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 27, 2017 CarswellOnt 105.
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Mr. Jain was found NCR on four charges of
uttering death threat and was detained at a health care facility. Since primary school, he has
been struggling with mental illness (diagnosed Bipolar I Disorder) and later substance abuse. A
conditional discharge was granted.
— Jain (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 356, 2017 CarswellOnt 2830.
Not Criminally Responsible (Review Board) — Mr. Im was found NCR on charges of criminal
harassment, uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, and failure to comply with probation
order. The Court did not make a disposition. The Board found his Schizophrenia and residual
psychotic symptoms continue to pose a threat and ordered detention at a treatment facility.
— Im (Re) (2017), O.R.B.D. No. 287, 2017 CarswellOnt 2607.
Charter considerations — The accused was sentenced to 1yr imprisonment followed by 2yr
probation for posting photos of his 16-year-old ex-girlfriend on the internet. He challenged the
constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of 1yr prescribed by s. 163.1(3) for
violating s. 12 of the Charter. Court found the section does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment – deterrence & denunciation were primary objectives when case involves abuse of
a minor (para 85).
— R. v. Shultz, 2008 ABQB 679.
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Uttering threats
264.1 (1) Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, knowingly utters, conveys
or causes any person to receive a threat
(a) to cause death or bodily harm to any person;
(b) to burn, destroy or damage real or personal property; or
(c) to kill, poison or injure an animal or bird that is the property of any person.
Punishment
(2) Every one who commits an offence under paragraph (1)(a) is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding eighteen months.
Idem
(3) Every one who commits an offence under paragraph (1)(b) or (c)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 38; 1994, c. 44, s. 16.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — actus reus — The actus reus of this offence is uttering, conveying, or
otherwise causing any person to receive a threat of death or serious bodily harm. Whether a
statement constitutes a threat is a question of law, assessed on an objective standard, with
regards to the particular context in which the statement is communicated.1 The Crown does not
need to prove the intended recipient was intimidated by the threat, or even aware of the threat.
It is also unnecessary for the threat to be directed towards a specific person; a threat towards a
particular group is sufficient.2
— 1R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 931.
— 2R. c. Rémy, [1993] R.J.Q. 1383, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 176 (QCCA).
Essential elements — mens rea — The mens rea of this offence is intent to have the threat
intimidate, or to be taken seriously. This fault element is disjunctive. While this is a subjective
standard, the court will often have to draw inferences from the words and circumstances to
determine whether the requisite mens rea was present.1 The accused need not have intended
to convey the threat to the intended victim of the threat, or to carry out the threat.2 It is sufficient
the accused intended that those to whom the words were spoken take the threat seriously.3
— 1R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 931.
— 2R. v. Tibando (1994), 69 O.A.C. 225, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 229 (ONCA), para. 2.
— 3R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 931, para. 17, citing R. v. Clemente, [1994] 2
S.C.R. 758, [1994] S.C.J. No. 50.
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Charter concerns — S. 264.1 infringes the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by s.
2(b) of the Charter, but is saved by s. 1 of the Charter.
— R. v. Clemente (1993), 92 Man.R. (2d) 51, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 398 (MBCA), aff’d in R. v.
Clemente, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 758, 95 Man.R. (2d) 161.
*****

Social media case law
Uttering threats on Twitter — A 19-year old accused posted a link on Twitter to a CTV article
entitled "Pauline Marois ready to call an election", with her own comment: "Good get the bitch
out of there before I bomb her”. Despite the accused’s regret, remorse and cooperation with the
police after being confronted by them about the tweet, she was angry and frustrated at the
moment she made this tweet and had the requisite intention to be taken seriously. She was
convicted of uttering threats. However, she was acquitted of criminal harassment (see above).
— R. v. Le Seelleur, 2014 QCCQ 12216, 2015EXP-309.
Uttering threats on Facebook — Through Facebook, the accused described to the
complainant his sexual fantasies, which included physically harming her in violent ways. Upon
arrest, the accused was found in possession of a hand-written note stating the accused could
only get sexual pleasure “if the female was undergoing extreme pain, being raped, abused,
tortured, or was [...] crying”. When establishing the intent behind the Facebook messages, the
court noted the accused’s incriminating words. Furthermore, given the brevity of relationship
between the parties, it was reasonable to conclude the accused’s Facebook messages were
serious when they conveyed he did not care if she consented to being harmed.
— R. v. D.D., 2013 ONCJ 134, 105 W.C.B. (2d) 345.
Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused had previously posted images of swastikas, a
single reference to the Virginia Tech massacre, and anti-Semitic comments on his Facebook
profile. The police cautioned him about these posts, but no charges were laid. About a month
later, the accused posted a status update on his profile reading: “I’m wearing black and I’m
riding black this time around…I’m bringing death with me this time around.” The court noted that
the format of a Facebook status update “diminishes the seriousness” of these words (para. 9).
After considering the accused’s habit of posting hourly Facebook updates on what he was
doing, political opinions, and biblical references, the court concluded there was a reasonable
doubt as to whether the accused intended his status update as a death threat.
— R. v. Lee, 2010 ONCJ 291, 89 W.C.B. (2d) 209.
Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused posted a number of Facebook statuses that,
“[v]iewed objectively…would convey a threat of serious bodily harm” (para. 7). However, the
court concluded the accused did not mean to intimidate, because people use Facebook to
construct an alternate persona, the postings were mere expressions of emotions directed
towards those who might be sympathetic to the accused’s anger at losing his son, the accused
had numerous contacts with the apparent targets of his threats, yet did not do anything, and the
accused testified he posted these items to blow off steam, as he was taught in a prior anger
management course.
— R. v. Sather, 2008 ONCJ 98, 78 W.C.B. (2d) 285.
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Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused posted a number of statuses on Facebook
advocating for the death of political figures, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Alberta
Premier Rachel Notley. The accused had previously been warned by police that threats to kill or
cause bodily harm “cross the line” of s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code. This case was distinguished
from R. v. Sather (above) on the basis that the accused in this case did not adduce any
evidence that his comments were part of an attempt to create an alternate persona, or intended
simply as an attempt to blow off steam.
— R. v. Hayes, 2017 SKPC 8, [2017] S.J. No. 40.
Uttering threats on Facebook — The accused was acquitted on an Uttering Threats charge
based on a reasonable doubt about whether the accused intended to intimidate or be feared,
given that the accused’s statements were phrased in an apparently facetious or absurd manner,
despite their hateful content. (See, however, entry for R. c. Rioux under s. 319, inciting hatred.)
— R. c. Rioux, 2016 QCCQ 6762, 2016EXP-2527, unofficial English translation available at
2016 CarswellQue 13004.
Uttering threats on Facebook — Consideration of accused’s explanation of comments —
The accused successfully appealed convictions for uttering threats and s. 464 counselling the
commission of an indictable offence (murder) on the basis that the trial judge failed to consider
the explanations that the accused offered for comments he had posted on Facebook, as well as
the fact that the accused deleted the comments once he realized they were attracting
controversy. The court rejected the Crown’s claim that the accused’s clarification, that he meant
to call for the death of particular individuals only after lawful trials in a jurisdiction that retains the
death penalty, went to motive and not to intention. The explanations offered were found to go
beyond motive, and to provide context for the interpretation of the accused’s comments.
— Joad c. R., 2016 QCCA 1940, 136 W.C.B. (2d) 231.
Uttering threats – Admissibility of Facebook evidence – The accused was charged with one
count of assault causing bodily harm and one count of uttering a threat to cause death or bodily
harm to the complainant, his wife. On the alleged date of the offence, the accused and the
complainant were in their home. The complainant sent Facebook messages to her landlady
indicating that an assault had occurred and that she needed help. The court assessed the
admissibility of the Facebook hearsay evidence using the framework from R v Bradshaw, [2017]
SCJ No 35 (SCC). Under this framework, the court was satisfied that the corroborative evidence
ruled out the alternative explanations such that the only remaining explanation for the statement
was the accuracy of its material aspects, and substantive reliability of the hearsay evidence was
established.
— R. v. ASG, 2019 BCPC 5, 2019 CarswellBC 78
Authentication of Facebook evidence —The accused appealed a conviction for uttering
threats based on, among other grounds, the failure of the trial judge to consider s. 31.1 of the
Canada Evidence Act (CEA), or to adequately authenticate evidence consisting of a screenshot
alleged to depict a Facebook post by the accused. The appeal was rejected. S. 31.1 CEA was
explained as simply a codification of the common-law rules of authentication, and the Crown
was found to have sufficiently authenticated the documents by putting them to the complainant
on direct examination. As to the integrity of the documents, although the screenshot had been
provided by a friend of the complainant, the trial judge adequately addressed the issue of
integrity by identifying pieces of evidence that led to the conclusion that it would be speculative
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to conclude that anyone but the accused had authored the messages.
— R. v. Hirsch, 2017 SKCA 14, [2017] S.J. No. 59.
Limits on the Charter right to freedom of expression — After posting on Facebook a general
threat to women, the accused was charged with uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm
to all women. The self-represented accused petitioned, amongst other things, that what was
posted on Facebook was protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter, and was thus inadmissible as
evidence. The court disagreed, because s. 1 of the Charter allows reasonable limits — such as
s. 264 of the Criminal Code — on s. 2(b) rights.
— R. v. Hunt, 2012 QCCQ 4688, 2012EXP-2784.
Sentencing for terrorist threat on Twitter — The accused communicated via Twitter with
Islamic extremists and supporters of ISIS, culminating in his writing “Give me Canadian
addresses. I will ensure something happens.” He pled guilty to uttering threats for this
statement. Given the circumstances of the accused, that he had few followers on Twitter, that
he did not actually intend to engage in terrorist activity, and that the offence was essentially a
nuisance to law enforcement, on appeal his sentence of one-year imprisonment was found to
have unduly emphasized deterrence and denunciation such that it was reduced to six months
imprisonment.
— R. v. Boissoneau, 2016 ONSC 820, 128 W.C.B. (2d) 399.
Sentencing for uttering threats — The accused pled guilty to, among other things, uttering a
threat on Facebook to burn property. The accused was sentenced to three months’
incarceration, and a twelve-month probation period to follow. Probation conditions included
prohibitions on communicating, including by Facebook, with victims of his threats.
— R. v. Saunders, 2013 CanLII 75485, 343 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271 (NLPC).
Sentencing for uttering threats — The accused was convicted of knowingly uttering a threat
to cause death by electronic messaging; specifically, the accused used Snapchat to threaten to
commit school shootings. The accused was 18 years old at the time of sentencing and was a
first offender. The court considered it an aggravating factor that the accused had engaged in
similar online threats in the past, at which time the police had not charged him but had
cautioned and advised him of the illegality of his actions. Accordingly, the court did not accept
that the accused did not understand the seriousness of Snapchat threats. Balancing the
sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation with those of restraint, rehabilitation and
reintegration back into the community, the court determined that a suspended sentence with
three years’ probation would be appropriate and just.
— R v Richardson, 2018 ONCJ 171, 2018 CarswellOnt 4301
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Sexual assault
265 (1) A person commits an assault when
(a)
without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that
other person, directly or indirectly;
(b)
he attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another
person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable
grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or
(c)
while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts
or impedes another person or begs.
Application
(2) This section applies to all forms of assault, including sexual assault, sexual assault
with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm and aggravated sexual
assault.
Consent
(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the complainant
submits or does not resist by reason of
(a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the
complainant;
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or to a person other
than the complainant;
(c) fraud; or
(d) the exercise of authority.
Accused’s belief as to consent
(4) Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the
conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a
defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the
determination of the honesty of the accused’s belief, to consider the presence or
absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 244; 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 21; 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s. 19.
*****
271 Everyone who commits a sexual assault is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10
years or, if the complainant is under the age of 16 years, to imprisonment for a
term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for
a term of one year; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a
term of not more than 18 months or, if the complainant is under the age of 16
years, to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 10; 1994, c. 44, s. 19; 2012, c. 1, s. 25; 2015, c. 23, s. 14
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*****

General case law
Essential elements — The actus reus of this offence contains three elements: 1) touching; 2)
the sexual nature of the contact; and 3) the absence of consent. The first two elements are
objective, and it is sufficient that the accused’s actions were voluntary even absent mens rea
with respect to the sexual nature of his behaviour. The third element is subjective, determined
by reference to the complainant’s subjective internal state of mind towards the touching at the
time it occurred. The mens rea of this offence contains two elements: 1) intention to touch, and
2) knowing of, or being reckless or wilfully blind to, a lack of consent on the part of the person
touched. The accused may deny the requisite mens rea by asserting an honest but mistaken
belief in consent; the common law and Criminal Code provisions in ss. 273.1(2) and 273.2 limit
this defence.
— R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193.
Assessing the sexual nature of contact — Determining whether the impugned conduct has
the requisite sexual nature is an objective inquiry. Factors to consider are “the part of the body
touched, the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures
accompanying the act, and all other circumstances surrounding the conduct, including threats
which may or may not be accompanied by force”. Desire for sexual gratification or other motives
may also be a factor, but it is simply one of many factors to be considered.1 In fact, it has been
held that since sexual assault is an act of power, aggression and control, “sexual gratification, if
present, is at best a footnote.”2
— 1R. v. Chase, [1987] 2 SCR 293, 45 DLR (4th) 98, para. 11.
— 2R. v. K.B.V. (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 20, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (ONCA), para. 10.
Evidentiary issues — S. 276 restricts the purposes to which evidence of the complainant’s
past sexual activity can be put. These restrictions, along with the accompanying procedures in
ss. 276.1-276.5 do not violate ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.1 Sections 278.1-278.91 set out a
procedure by which the defence can apply for the disclosure of records in which the
complainant has a privacy interest. These sections are a response to the common-law system
devised in R. v. O’Connor.2 This procedure is Charter-compliant.3
— 1R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, S.C.J. No. 46, para. 22.
— 2R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, S.C.J. No. 98.
— 3R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, S.C.J. No. 68.
Consent — “The sexual activity in question” — S. 273.1 defines “consent”, and prescribes
situations where consent is not obtained. It can either be proven that the complainant did not
agree to the touching, its sexual nature, or the identity of the accused, or, if those factors are not
established, that there were factors that would operate to vitiate the complainant’s apparent
consent. The “sexual activity in question” is defined by the touching, its sexual nature, and the
identity of the accused only, and does not incorporate factors such as condom use or STI
status. These factors should instead be considered as part of fraud vitiating consent.1 Prior
consent does not remain operative at future times, particularly where a complainant becomes
unconscious.2
— 1 R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, 1 SCR 346.
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— 2 R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28, 2 SCR 440; R. v. Ashlee, 2006 ABCA 244, 61 Alta. L.R. (4th)
226, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 415.
Consent no defence — S. 150.1 provides that the consent of a complainant under the age of
16 is no defence to, among others, an offence under s. 271. This limitation is not a violation of s.
7 of the Charter.1
— 1R. v. Hann (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (NLCA).
*****

Social media case law
Admissibility of Facebook conversations as evidence — The court ruled screenshots of a
Facebook conversation between the accused and victim constituted an “electronic document”
under s. 31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act. The victim’s testimony of how Facebook works — in
addition to the lack of evidence presented to doubt the integrity of the screenshots — was
sufficient for the court to determine the screenshots were admissible as electronic documents.
The court also found the accused was the person chatting with the victim on Facebook. While
the screenshots constituted hearsay evidence, they were admitted under an exception to the
hearsay rule.
— R. v. Soh, 2014 NBQB 20, 416 N.B.R. (2d) 328.
Snapchat evidence used to bolster credibility — While in a car with the accused shortly
before the assault took place, the complainant sent a Snapchat, depicting the accused and
subtitled “I’m scared”, along with text messages, to her sister and another friend. At trial, the
consistent description of this Snapchat message by witnesses was used to bolster the credibility
of those witnesses, as well as that of the complainant. Although the Snapchat could only be
described by witnesses at the time of trial, given the self-destructing nature of the medium, the
text messages sent alongside were used to confirm a witness’ description of the timeline of
events.
— R. v. Qhasimy, 2017 ABPC 83, [2017] A.J. No. 398.
Facebook evidence used to bolster credibility — Facebook messages between the accused
and the complainant, along with text messages and messages sent via the Xbox Live gaming
service, were used to bolster the complainant’s credibility, and to demonstrate the need for the
accused to have made further inquiries into the complainant’s consent, given that the
complainant had previously been very clear that she did not consent to penetrative sexual
intercourse.
— R. v. J.P., 2017 BCPC 71, [2017] B.C.J. No. 497.
Facebook evidence used to impeach credibility — Facebook messages sent between the
complainant and accused, and the complainant and a relative, were used to impeach the
complainant’s credibility, resulting in an acquittal.
— R. v. Norton, 2017 ONSC 1395, [2017] O.J. No. 1343.
Facebook messages as evidence – accused denies identity in Facebook evidence – The
accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of his 4-year-old daughter.
The complainant’s mother, upon learning of the molestations, sought support from a family
friend. This family friend’s daughter and the accused apparently engaged in Facebook
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communication, in which the accused essentially admitted to molesting his daughter. The
accused denied molesting his daughter, and also denied ever communicating with the family
friend’s daughter on Facebook. On the facts, the court rejected the accused’s evidence, and
concluded the accused was the author of the impugned Facebook messages. To believe
someone other than the accused sent the Facebook messages would “strain credulity.” Further,
“[t]he accused's denial of that damning piece of evidence entirely undermines his credibility on
the central issues,” namely, his denial of the charged offences. The court found the accused
guilty of all charges.
— R. v. B.R., [2017] O.J. No. 3782, 2017 ONSC 4429, para 40, 54
Admissibility of Facebook messages for the truth of their contents – The accused was
charged with the sexual assault of “J”, a mutual friend of himself and his wife, “R”. At trial, R
testified that she witnessed the accused and J engaging in consensual sex. However, in
Facebook posts, R stated that J was unconscious and did not consent. The court determined
that the Facebook posts had sufficient threshold reliability to be admitted as out-of-court
statements, in part because R was available for cross-examination.
— R. v. C.F.N., 2018 YKSC 19
Instagram post as evidence of consent – The accused, who suffered from cerebral palsy and
multiple mental illnesses, was charged with two counts of sexual assault of the complainant.
The accused took the position that the sexual activity was consensual or, in the alternative, that
he had a mistaken belief that the complainant consented. The accused and the complainant
were both over the age of consent and had a relationship with sexual overtones at the time of
the alleged offences. They often spoke about violent sex, rape fantasies, suicidal ideation, and
the infliction of pain. Near the end of their relationship, the complainant posted a photo of herself
on Instagram with the caption “it was consensual but consequential”. The accused submitted
this Instagram post as evidence of the complainant’s consent. In the context of the relationship
between the accused and the complainant, the court did not accept the complainant’s testimony
that the post had nothing to do with the accused and was only wordplay. The court concluded
that the Crown failed to establish lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further
stated that if it had not determined the case on this basis, the court would have found that the
accused had an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant consented. The accused was
found not guilty.
— R. v. Shepperd, 2018 ONCJ 692
Temporary nature of Snapchat communications – The alleged offence occurred when the
accused and the complainant met up on a Sunday night, but their text message conversation
only referenced plans on Monday night. By “rational inference”, the court determined that the
accused and the complainant must have discussed their Sunday night plans over Snapchat.
The court also discussed the temporary nature of messages sent over Snapchat, and
specifically that they are not retrievable by the court as they are not stored on a server.
— R. v. Hamidi, [2018] OJ No 2788, para 19, 86
Accused denies identity in Snapchat evidence – The accused was charged with sexual
assault. The complainant provided a screenshot of a Snapchat conversation with someone who
implicitly admitted to sexual intercourse with the complainant. The complainant testified that the
interlocutor in the Snapchat conversation was the accused, while the accused denied it was
him. On that facts, the judge was convinced that the interlocutor was indeed the accused; the
accused’s denial eroded his credibility, while the Snapchat conversation as a whole bolstered
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the complainant’s version of events. As such, the court found the accused guilty of sexual
assault.
— R. v. J.M., [2018] O.J. No. 188, 2018 ONSC 344
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The court noted the
complainant lied about her age and her Facebook profile picture “shows a young person trying
to seem significantly older than her 14 years” (para. 9). However, while the complainant may
well have been manipulative, this was “[a]ll the more reason” the 40-year-old accused should
have made more inquiries into the complainant’s age before having sex with her (para. 56). The
court convicted the accused of sexual interference and sexual assault.
— R. v. Beckford, 2016 ONSC 1066, 28 W.C.B. (2d) 298.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —Though there was no
evidence as to whether the accused had access to the complainant’s full Facebook profile, it
was plausible that the accused saw the complainant’s fake age on Facebook. This was one of
eight factors that led the court to conclude there was reasonable doubt as to whether the
accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. The court acquitted
the accused of sexual assault and sexual interference.
— R. v. Akinsuyi, 2016 ONSC 2103, 129 W.C.B. (2d) 515.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The 17-year-old accused
had a sexual relationship with the 12-year-old complainant. Among other things, the court found
the complainant lied about her age and posted pictures of herself on Facebook designed to
make her look sexually mature. The accused also immediately terminated their relationship after
the complainant told him she was twelve. The court acquitted the accused of sexual assault and
sexual interference.
— R. v. R.R., 2014 ONCJ 96, 112 W.C.B. (2d) 302.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The complainant listed her
age as 16 on Facebook, when she was in fact 12. The court noted it was common for youth to
lie about their age to gain access to Facebook, thus the complainant’s behavior was not
“particularly probative of dishonesty” (para. 47). On the facts, the court found the accused did
not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age, and thus convicted him of
sexual assault (and directed a conditional stay of proceedings on the sexual interference
charge).
— R. v. Z.I.D., 2012 BCPC 570, [2012] B.C.J. No. 3079.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age —The court accepted the
accused honestly believed the complainant was at least 16 or 17, in part due to the
complainant’s listed age on Facebook, and the “general tenor of her website pages…[as] trying
to portray herself as someone much older than thirteen” (para. 22). Other factors included racial
difference and the accused’s recent arrival to Canada from St. Vincent. On the facts, the court
deemed the accused to have taken reasonable steps to ascertain her age, and acquitted him of
sexual assault and sexual interference.
— R. v. Garraway, 2010 ONCJ 642, 92 W.C.B. (2d) 210.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The court accepted that the
accused, who was 18, honestly believed that the complainant was 15, and not 12. The
complainant’s Facebook profile indicated that she was 15, and the accused confirmed that the
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complainant’s birthday was the one listed on Facebook, without confirming the year. There was
a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s evidence that she had told the accused her age.
The Crown argued that it would be obvious to a reasonable person that information on
Facebook is not necessarily true. This argument was partially rejected, with the court finding
that it would have been sensible to be sceptical of information found on Facebook, but that the
information available on Facebook is not so unreliable that no reasonable person would have
relied on it.
— R. v. D.O., 2017 ONSC 2027, [2017] O.J. No. 1787.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age — The accused, who was 20
at the time, had sex with the 14-year-old complainant. The accused had significant learning
disabilities, and was immature for his age. He and the complainant were part of a group of
friends most of whom were 17. On one occasion, the complainant told the accused’s mother, in
front of the accused, that she was 17. The complainant’s Facebook profile indicated that she
was 19. The Crown argued that this discrepancy should have prompted further inquiries from
the accused, but the court rejected that argument on the basis that there was a reasonable
doubt about what age was indicated on the profile at the relevant time.
— R. v. Minzen, 2017 ONCJ 127, [2017] O.J. No. 1182.
Taking reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age – The accused was charged
with sexual interference and sexual assault. The court found that the complainant had pursued
the developmentally delayed accused, who has an estimated grade four education. Taking this
context into account, the court concluded the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the
complainant’s age — the accused asked the complainant for her age, but “received a coy
response”; he checked her Facebook page and found no birthdate; he knew she was attending
high school; and his belief that she looked older than sixteen was corroborated by a photo filed
as an exhibit. The court acquitted the accused on both charges.
— R. v. C.G.V., [2017] O.J. No. 6485, 2017 ONCJ 850
Honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s age – The accused was charged with
sexual interference and sexual assault. “Notwithstanding that the Complainant's Facebook
profile identified her as 16 years old and said she went to the high school in Community B, and
she had used filters on her profile pictures to enhance her apparent age, I am satisfied that
these factors did not cause the Accused to have an honest belief that she was 16 years old or
older. The Accused testified that he only looked at a few of the pictures. He did not claim that
the Complainant's Facebook profile or photographs led him to believe that she was 16.”
— R. v. J.M., [2017] N.J. No. 223, 2017 NLTD(G) 110, 139 W.C.B. (2d) 250, para 51
Sentencing – In March 2014, the offender sexually assaulted the unconscious complainant,
and in August 2014, the offender sexually assaulted her by force. The offender recorded the
sexual assaults and, in August 2014, posted still images from the recordings on the
complainant’s Instagram account. The court considered whether the recording of sexual
assaults was an aggravating factor in sentencing. The court did not consider the recording of
the March 2014 assaults to be an aggravating factor in sentencing, as the offender was
separately charged and convicted for that aspect of the assault under s 162. The offender was
not charged under s 162 in relation to the August 2014 assault; therefore, the court considered
the making and publishing of images relating to that assault to be an aggravating factor
regarding that offence. The court also concluded that the two offences required a consecutive
sentence, as each protected a different societal interest: privacy and bodily integrity.
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— R. v. Johnson, 2018 ONSC 5133
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Obtaining Sexual Services for Consideration
286.1 (1) Everyone who, in any place, obtains for consideration, or communicates with
anyone for the purpose of obtaining for consideration, the sexual services of a person is
guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than
five years and a minimum punishment of,
(i) in the case where the offence is committed in a public place, or in any
place open to public view, that is or is next to a park or the grounds of a
school or religious institution or that is or is next to any other place where
persons under the age of 18 can reasonably be expected to be present,
(A) for a first offence, a fine of $2,000, and
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of $4,000, or
(ii) in any other case,
(A) for a first offence, a fine of $1,000, and
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of $2,000; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a
term of not more than 18 months and a minimum punishment of,
(i) in the case referred to in subparagraph (a)(i),
(A) for a first offence, a fine of $1,000, and
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of $2,000, or
(ii) in any other case,
(A) for a first offence, a fine of $500, and
(B) for each subsequent offence, a fine of $1,000.
Obtaining sexual services for consideration from person under 18 years
(2) Everyone who, in any place, obtains for consideration, or communicates with anyone
for the purpose of obtaining for consideration, the sexual services of a person under the
age of 18 years is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of
not more than 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
(a) for a first offence, six months; and
(b) for each subsequent offence, one year.
Subsequent offences
(3) In determining, for the purpose of subsection (2), whether a convicted person has
committed a subsequent offence, if the person was earlier convicted of any of the
following offences, that offence is to be considered as an earlier offence:
(a) an offence under that subsection; or
(b) an offence under subsection 212(4) of this Act, as it read from time to time
before the day on which this subsection comes into force.
Sequence of convictions only
(4) In determining, for the purposes of this section, whether a convicted person has
committed a subsequent offence, the only question to be considered is the sequence of
convictions and no consideration shall be given to the sequence of commission of
offences, whether any offence occurred before or after any conviction or whether
offences were prosecuted by indictment or by way of summary conviction proceedings.
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Definitions of place and public place
(5) For the purposes of this section, place and public place have the same meaning as in
subsection 197(1).
2014, c. 25, s. 20.
*****

Social media case law
Reasonable steps to ascertain age of the complainant – Charged under s 286.1(2), the
accused submitted that he thought the 16-year-old complainant was 21 because her Facebook
page said that she was born in 1994, and because she had photos of herself with alcohol on
Facebook. When the accused had asked the complainant her age, she failed to answer. The
court found that the Facebook evidence was not sufficient, and that a reasonable person would
have asked more questions. In an interview with police, the accused acknowledged several
times that the complainant was 16. Accordingly, the accused was found guilty.
— R. v. Alcorn, 2018 MBQB 17
Facebook messages as evidence of sexual intention – The accused was charged under s
286.1(2). The accused had sent many Facebook messages of a sexual nature to the 13-yearold complainant. The court accepted these Facebook messages as evidence of the accused’s
sexual interest in the complainant and the accused’s hope of establishing a sexual relationship.
— R. v. Dawe, 2018 CarswellNfld 205
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Public incitement of hatred
319 (1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred
against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the
peace is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Wilful promotion of hatred
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation,
wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Defences
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2)
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true;
(b) if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an
argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a
religious text;
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion
of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed
them to be true; or
(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters
producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable
group in Canada.
Forfeiture
(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under section 318 or subsection (1) or (2)
of this section, anything by means of or in relation to which the offence was committed,
on such conviction, may, in addition to any other punishment imposed, be ordered by
the presiding provincial court judge or judge to be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of the
province in which that person is convicted, for disposal as the Attorney General may
direct.
Exemption from seizure of communication facilities
(5) Subsections 199(6) and (7) apply with such modifications as the circumstances
require to section 318 or subsection (1) or (2) of this section.
Consent
(6) No proceeding for an offence under subsection (2) shall be instituted without the
consent of the Attorney General.
Definitions
(7) In this section,
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communicating includes communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible or
visible means; (communiquer)
identifiable group has the same meaning as in section 318; (groupe identifiable)
public place includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by
invitation, express or implied; (endroit public)
statements includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electromagnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations.
(déclarations)
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 319; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 203; 2004, c. 14, s. 2.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — Ss. 319(1) and (2) each create an offence relating to hate speech. The
offence in s. 319(1) requires that the accused 1) incite hatred by 2) communicating 3) in a public
place 4) words likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The narrower offence in s. 319(2),
however, requires that the accused 1) wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group by 2)
communicating statements, other than in private conversation. The offence in s. 319(2) requires
the consent of the Attorney General for prosecution (s. 319(6)). S. 319(3) provides for a number
of defences to the offence in s. 319(2).
— R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 101 DLR (3d) 488, 49 CCC (2d) 369 (ONCA).
Essential elements — Mens rea —The use of “wilfully” in s. 319(2) requires that the accused
intend the promotion of hatred. Recklessness will not suffice.1 “Promotes” requires active
support or instigation, and hatred involves an emotion “of an intense and extreme nature that is
clearly associated with vilification and detestation”.2
— 1R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 101 DLR (3d) 488, 49 CCC (2d) 369 (ONCA).
— 2R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 61 CCC (3d) 1.
Charter concerns — Freedom of expression — Presumption of innocence — This section
violates s. 2(b) of the Charter, but that violation is saved by s. 1. This section violates s. 11(d) of
the Charter, but is saved by s. 1.1
— 1R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 61 CCC (3d) 1.

*****

Social media case law
Inciting hatred and uttering threats on Facebook — Over the course of a single afternoon
and evening, the accused posted comments in response to a news article that had been posted
on the official Facebook page of a leading television news broadcast. The accused expressed,
in the comments section below the story, a desire to commit violent acts against members of
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Québec’s Muslim minority. The accused was acquitted of uttering threats (see above), but
convicted of inciting hatred contrary to s. 319. The judge relied in part on the responses of other
commenters on the article to find that the accused’s comments provoked “apprehension, fear,
and condemnation”. The judge also found that the accused’s comments were distinct from those
of other commenters in failing to demonstrate a desire to engage in discussion, but rather to
simply express the resentment that the accused had towards the group in question. As a freely
accessible website for public exchange, the Facebook page in question qualified as a “public
place” (“endroit public”) under s. 319. The defence argued that the comments did not specifically
identify a targeted group, but the court found that the context, including where the comments
were posted, and the posts of other commenters to which the accused responded, allowed for a
determination that the targeted group was Muslims. The court found that the accused’s use of
violent language, suggested use of force in order to share his intolerance, and insults towards
those inclined towards acceptance of the Muslim community, were liable to lead to a breach of
the peace.
— R. c. Rioux, 2016 QCCQ 6762, 2016EXP-2527, unofficial English translation available at
2016 CarswellQue 13004.
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Unauthorized use of computer
342.1 (1) Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term
of not more than 10 years, or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction
who, fraudulently and without colour of right,
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service;
(b) by means of an electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, intercepts
or causes to be intercepted, directly or indirectly, any function of a computer
system;
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a computer system with intent to
commit an offence under paragraph (a) or (b) or under section 430 in relation to
computer data or a computer system; or
(d) uses, possesses, traffics in or permits another person to have access to a
computer password that would enable a person to commit an offence under
paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
Definitions
(2) In this section,
computer data means representations, including signs, signals or symbols, that are in a
form suitable for processing in a computer system; (données informatiques)
computer password means any computer data by which a computer service or computer
system is capable of being obtained or used; (mot de passe)
computer program means computer data representing instructions or statements that,
when executed in a computer system, causes the computer system to perform a
function; (programme d’ordinateur)
computer service includes data processing and the storage or retrieval of computer data;
(service d’ordinateur)
computer system means a device that, or a group of interconnected or related devices
one or more of which,
(a) contains computer programs or other computer data, and
(b) by means of computer programs,
(i) performs logic and control, and
(ii) may perform any other function; (ordinateur)
data [Repealed, 2014, c. 31, s. 16]
electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device means any device or apparatus
that is used or is capable of being used to intercept any function of a computer system,
but does not include a hearing aid used to correct subnormal hearing of the user to not
better than normal hearing; (dispositif électromagnétique, acoustique, mécanique ou
autre)
function includes logic, control, arithmetic, deletion, storage and retrieval and
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communication or telecommunication to, from or within a computer system; (fonction)
intercept includes listen to or record a function of a computer system, or acquire the
substance, meaning or purport thereof; (intercepter)
traffic means, in respect of a computer password, to sell, export from or import into
Canada, distribute or deal with in any other way. (trafic)
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 45; 1997, c. 18, s. 18; 2014, c. 31, s. 16.
*****

General case law
Essential elements — This section creates four offences: 1) “obtaining” a computer service or
system under s. 342.1(1)(a), 2) “interception” of, or causing to be intercepted, any function of a
computer system, which must be made by the specified means, under s. 342.1(1)(b), 3) “using”
or causing to be used, directly or indirectly a computer system, with the accompanying mens
rea that the use be with intent to commit the specified offences, under s. 342.1(1)(c), and 4)
“enabling”, by using, possessing, trafficking, or allowing another person access to a computer
password that would enable that person to commit an offence under subs. (a), (b), or (c).
Essential elements — s. 342.1(1)(a) — The actus reus of the offence in s. 342.1(1)(a) requires
that the accused obtained computer services, that that utilization was prohibited, that a
reasonable person in the same situation would have concluded that the activity was dishonest,
and that the act was done without colour of right. The mens rea required by the s. 342.1(1)(a)
offence is that the accused consciously and voluntarily obtained computer services. This
requires proof of intention to do the prohibited act, knowing that that act was prohibited by
reference to the intended ends of the usage of the computer system.1
— 1R. c. Parent, 2012 QCCA 1653, [2012] R.J.Q. 1817.
Meaning of “computer system” – “Computer system” appears to include text messaging via
cellular phones,1 though it has also been found that a Blackberry is not a “computer system”,
absent any expert evidence on this point.2
— 1R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, 107 O.R. (3d) 81.
— 2R. v. Cockell, 2013 ABCA 112, 553 A.R. 91.

*****

Social media case law
Definition of “computer system” — A computer and Facebook account used to send
messages constitute a “computer system” within the meaning of s. 342.1 of the Criminal Code.
— R. v. A.H., 2016 ONSC 3709, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 302.
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on
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children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment, emphasizing the
sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and dismissed the accused’s
argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18).
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545.
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Extortion
346 (1) Every one commits extortion who, without reasonable justification or excuse and
with intent to obtain anything, by threats, accusations, menaces or violence induces or
attempts to induce any person, whether or not he is the person threatened, accused or
menaced or to whom violence is shown, to do anything or cause anything to be done.
Extortion
(1.1) Every person who commits extortion is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the
offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence
is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal
organization, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of
(i)
in the case of a first offence, five years, and
(ii)
in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years;
(a.1) in any other case where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to
imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
four years; and
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life.
Subsequent offences
(1.2) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (1.1)(a), whether a convicted person
has committed a second or subsequent offence, if the person was earlier convicted of
any of the following offences, that offence is to be considered as an earlier offence:
(a) an offence under this section;
(b) an offence under subsection 85(1) or (2) or section 244 or 244.2; or
(c) an offence under section 220, 236, 239, 272 or 273, subsection 279(1) or section
279.1 or 344 if a firearm was used in the commission of the offence.
However, an earlier offence shall not be taken into account if 10 years have elapsed
between the day on which the person was convicted of the earlier offence and the day on
which the person was convicted of the offence for which sentence is being imposed, not
taking into account any time in custody.
Sequence of convictions only
(1.3) For the purposes of subsection (1.2), the only question to be considered is the
sequence of convictions and no consideration shall be given to the sequence of
commission of offences or whether any offence occurred before or after any conviction.
Saving
(2) A threat to institute civil proceedings is not a threat for the purposes of this section.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 346; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 46; 1995, c. 39, s. 150; 2008, c. 6,
s. 33; 2009, c. 22, s. 15.
*****
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General case law
Essential elements — The actus reus is made out when the accused 1) induced or attempted
to induce someone to do something or cause something to be done; 2) by using threats,
accusations, menaces, or violence; 3) without reasonable justification or excuse. The mens rea
of this offence is intending to obtain “anything” by the actus reus. The accused’s conduct must
be viewed in its entirety and in context.1 “Anything” has a “wide, unrestricted dictionary
definition, and includes sexual favours.”2 “Attempting to induce” will constitute the full offence of
extortion (not merely attempted extortion), even if the victim does not surrender to the accused’s
wishes.3
— 1R. v. Barros, 2011 SCC 51, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 368.
— 2R. v. Davis, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 759, S.C.J. No. 67, para. 43.
— 3R. v. Noël, 2001 NBCA 80, 239 N.B.R. (2d) 269.
Defining threats — The accused need not threaten to injure the victim personally; an
accused’s false statement that a third party with violent propensities or associations will deal
with the victim is sufficient to constitute a threat.1 A veiled reference may constitute a threat if, in
light of the particular context, it sufficiently conveys to the victim the consequences that the
victim fears or would prefer to avoid.2
— 1R. v. Swartz (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 409, 1 W.C.B. 336 (ONCA).
— 2R. v. Barros, 2011 SCC 51, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 368.
Defining reasonable justification or excuse — A reasonable justification or excuse is both
fact and offence specific. It “refers to some matter that is extraneous to the existence of the
essential elements of the offence that justifies or excuses actions that would otherwise
constitute the crime.” The burden is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of any reasonable justification or excuse. The question is not whether the particular
accused believed his threats were reasonably justified or excusable, but whether a reasonable
person in the accused’s position would have formed that view.1 The reasonable justification or
excuse must be not only for the demand, but also for the making of threats or menaces by
which the accused sought to compel compliance with the demand.2
— 1R. v. H.A. (2005), 202 O.A.C. 54, 206 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (ONCA), para. 72-74.
— 2R. v. Natarelli, [1967] S.C.R. 539, 1 C.C.C. 154.
*****

Social media case law
Definition of “Doxing” —“Doxing involves publishing on the internet identifiable personal
information about an individual that has usually been obtained from social media sites and from
hacking into private systems. Depending on the nature of the information, its disclosure can
cause the victim distress, fear, embarrassment and shame. The personal information can be
used by others to facilitate identity theft and fraud. The threat to publish private information can
also be used by the person who holds the information for extortion and blackmail purposes.”
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 3.
Definition of “Swatting” —“Swatting involves tricking an emergency service agency into
dispatching an emergency response based on a false report of an ongoing critical incident.
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Swatting can lead to the deployment of a range of emergency response teams including police,
fire and bomb squads and the evacuation of businesses, schools or other public institutions.”
— R. v. B.L.A., 2015 BCPC 203, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 85, para. 4.
Party liability through fake Facebook accounts — The accused created a fake Facebook
account to converse with the complainant. The accused’s friend used the account by remotely
accessing the accused’s computer, and proceeded to threaten the complainant with distributing
semi-nude and nude photos of her, unless she produced another picture. By permitting his
friend remote access to the computer and enabling him to assume the fake Facebook identity,
the court found the accused facilitated extortion.
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 14, 357 N.S.R. (2d) 340.
Fabrication of Facebook messages – Complainant’s consent to distribution of images –
The Crown’s position was that the accused attempted to extort the complainant using intimate
images of her, and that he posted two such images on Facebook and Skype without her
consent. The court found that, despite the complainant’s testimony to the contrary, she had
sufficient knowledge of computers such that she could have accessed the accused’s Facebook
account and feigned the offending messages which were presented at trial. The court also
found that the complainant may have given blanket consent for the accused to post intimate
images during their relationship. If her consent was later withdrawn, the Crown failed to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant images were still on the Internet at
that time. The accused was acquitted on both counts.
— R. v. Sobh, 2018 ONSC 2299
Establishing the identity of the accused – The complainant met someone named “Beau” on
Tinder, and after initial communication, sent him a picture of her breasts through Snapchat.
Beau saved the picture in a screenshot and used it to attempt to extort sexual favours from the
complainant. The complainant began to suspect the Beau was the accused, Cody Penney —
she had reviewed the accused’s Twitter page, finding similarities in the messages she had
received from Beau. The defence argued that all the evidence linking the accused to “Beau”
was circumstantial, and equally consistent with “someone posing as [the accused] on the
internet”. The court rejected this argument, find that, on the facts, the only reasonable inference
was that the accused was indeed “Beau”. The accused was convicted of extortion, uttering
threats, and harassment.
— R. v. Penney, [2017] N.J. No. 241, para 38
Sentencing – “[A] present day threat to release intimate photographs through social media cites
allows for the sharing and dissemination of such photographs on a worldwide basis. This
technology also makes it impossible for the victim to limit circulation or to retrieve the
photographs. This modern day form of extortion is much different and more serious than older
forms of extortion. The sentencing for such offences must reflect the changes in the sharing of
information and the impact upon victims. General deterrence and denunciation must be the
primary principles of sentencing applied.”
— R. v. Hunt, [2017] N.J. No. 430, para 8
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, possession of child pornography, and
11 counts of extortion. The terms of his 18-month probation included, among other things: not
possessing or using any computer or other device that has Internet access, except with

79

advance written permission; monitored use of Internet access, if granted; and the accused’s
identification by his full real name when communicating with anyone by means including
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or any other social network.
— R. v. R.W., 2016 ONCJ 325, 131 W.C.B. (2d) 68.
Sentencing — The accused was convicted of extortion, possession of child pornography, and
possession of child pornography for the purpose of distribution. Among other things, his
conditional discharge order prohibited accessing any Internet-based social media. The court
was concerned social media restrictions may impair the accused’s ability to overcome his social
anxiety and reintegrate”, but the nature of the accused’s offending made “it inappropriate to
permit social media access” unless and until rehabilitative progress is made (para. 56).
— R. v. Y., 2015 NSPC 66, 366 N.S.R. (2d) 57.
Sentencing — In considering an appeal of a sentence for numerous sexual offences, the court
noted the accused’s submitted sentencing decisions for comparison “were rendered some time
ago”; we better understand now the severe impact online sexual exploitation can have on
children (para. 17). Consequently, the court “must resort to imprisonment, emphasizing the
sentencing objectives of protection, punishment and deterrence”, and dismissed the accused’s
argument that the parity principle had been violated (para. 18).
— R. v. Mackie, 2014 ABCA 221, 588 A.R. 1.
Sentencing — The accused pled guilty to luring a child, extortion, distributing and accessing
child pornography, invitation to sexual touching, unauthorized use of computer, and other
offences. In determining his high moral blameworthiness, the court noted the accused’s “use of
the internet…have [sic] elements of disturbing online sexual harassment – an adult criminally
cyberbullying and cyberstalking” (para. 62). As an “online faceless unknown entity,” he was also
“all the more frightening for his victims” (para. 64).
— R. v. Mackie, 2013 ABPC 116, 106 W.C.B. (2d) 545.
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